Archive for May, 2014

Notes from Caracas…

May 29, 2014

agua

So much fun to go back to Caracas. You are excited when you arrive, but somewhat relieved when you leave. Some glimpses:

-Water. How easily one forgets about water shortages. It is so much fun to sleep in late on a Sunday, as you have nothing to do until later in the day. Stay in bed, read a book. Then, about 8 AM the pipes start making a gurgling noise, you realize that they are shutting off the water. Jump out, get under the cold shower. Shoot! You end up drying even the soap, not enough time. At least you feel clean…

Later in the week you go to the dentist. No water there either. Hard for a dentist to work with no water. His solution is simple, get a storage tank for his office. But it’s Catch-22, there is also a water tank shortage. Almost impossible to find one…

-Lunch and safety: Having lunch with fellow blogger Daniel from Venezuela News and Views. Small place within a nice Mall, where at least until now I have felt safe. Table next to the glass window. More tables outside the glass window. The lady sitting right outside the glass gets her handbag stolen. She screams  “Thief!”. Thief flees towards the parking lot. Shot heard from the parking lot. Daniel and I decided not to look into it. Better be safe.

-Rumor Merentes is on his way out of Central Bank. If the name I heard is the replacement, it is bad news. We shall see.

-Everyone talks about the airlines and the new prices and how expensive etc, etc. etc. Few talk about the lack of medicine supplies, basic pharmaceuticals and least of all, sophisticated ones. A paper reports that there are more amputations due to the lack of stents. Depressing.

-Maduro removes two opposition Mayors, elections are held to replace them and the respective wives of the removed Mayors win handily. VTV, the Government’s TV station does not even report the results. Bias? No way, would say anyone in Government. VTV did report the next day that PSUV accepted the results. What results,  would say a PSUV member that was distracted.

-And I refuse to write about the supposed conspiracy to remove Maduro, or the coup against Maduro or the “magnicidio” against Maduro. It is so silly and so faked, that in one of the purported emails sent by the conspirators, one of them was sent simultaneously from an iPad and from a blackberry device using T-Mobile. I did not know such devices combining both operating systems existed:

mailNot only do these guys fail to use Copy Paste properly, but you would think someone would check the work to be presented for errors and inconsistencies, such as this one.

Pretty cool though that the Mayor of Libertador talked about killing “President Machado”. Now we know what he is afraid of. Freud would be proud.

-And I am told that people no longer trust dolartoday as they used to do. Why? Friends suggest the real price is consistently Bs. 4-Bs. 8 higher than what that webpage is reporting. So, be careful out there.

-And Sicad 2 is becoming a daily sport for many. Go to the bank every morning to see if you get some that day. Get some, sell them at the parallel rate, go back to square one. Just don’t say you are buying in Sicad2 to sell higher. We have seen this movie before.

-Shortages: Many things are in short supply. Milk seems to be the most relevant one these days. Everyone in the office drinks black coffee now. Bakeries periodically have signs that say: No flour, no bread. But it usually lasts only a day or two. I did find Coca Cola this time around.

NoHayPan-600x320

It’s not as bad as it sounds, the arepas are still delicious, so are the cachapas and this time around, it was Spondias Purpurea season, better known as ciruela e’huesito . Who can complain?

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Unfortunately, A Bleak Future For Venezuelans.

May 24, 2014

Qatar-Pharmaceuticals-470x230_01

Yesterday I saw a tweet that I knew was wrong stating that American Airlines had stopped selling tickets in both local currency and dollars, which sort of implied the airline was leaving Venezuela. I knew the tweet was wrong, as that same morning both my travel agent in Caracas and American Airlines in the US had called me to tell me that the airline had opened for sale tickets in US$ until the end of July. I checked in the website and indeed, for the day I was looking for a CCS-MIA flight in July, there was plenty of available flights and tickets, as promised, if you paid in US$. Thus, when I saw the tweet with information that I knew to be wrong I corrected it, mostly because I know the sense of anguish that many people with relatives abroad feel thinking that they may become isolated in Venezuela if the airlines leave.

What I got in return was tweets saying that I was  a minority with a credit card in US$, that I worked with the stock market, Cadivi rules and the like and beware about bond prices when American announces that is leaving Venezuela, which had nothing to do with my correction. Later the person apologized, but I think this demonstrates how charged and emotional this topic is.

But it also shows, how somehow people think that the Government is not paying airlines because it does not care, or, as some have suggested, this is all being done on purpose to isolate the country. People also blame the airlines for abusing the system. But the reality is much different, the airlines have been naive in thinking they would be paid eventually. And Venezuelans have yet to face the reality that, much like Greeks three years ago, the time is coming to pay for the errors of the Government of the past few years. The cheap travel, the Cadivi subsidies, all subsidies, have to be paid down the line with expensive travel costs and no subsidies. There is simply no money to pay the airlines.

Or the pharmaceutical companies, or the food companies, or the oil service companies…

Perhaps no headline describes this more clearly than that of the President of the Venezuelan Airline Association (ALAV) saying “The debt with the airlines is more than the operating international reserves of the country”

That simple statement summarizes the problem quite clearly, how can the Government pay its debts, when all of its operating (Not liquid, operating!) international reserves are not enough to pay the debt with the airlines?

But think about it, the Government also owes the pharmaceutical sector US$ 4 billion, and more billions here and there. And the days go by and it does not pay any of it (The debts actually increase). Why? Because there is no money to pay the debts. In fact, CADIVI approvals, which pay for current and future imports, were also sharply down in the first four months of the year.

The Government keeps trying to stretch it. But at some point, it will have to do something about it. It will have to stop subsides to Petrocaribe and Cuba, or not pay external debt, or devalue, or increase the price of gas, or some of the above or all of the above. But no matter which solution is decided on, it will be Venezuelans that will have to pay in the future for the errors of their Government. Someone has to pay the subsidies and the excesses and it will be all of Venezuelans, whether by paying much higher prices for everything, including flights abroad, or not having goods to purchase or reducing their purchasing power. It is a sad prospect, but it is reality.

Ask the Greeks, they lived through it three years ago, after years of living it up beyond their means.

And, of course, people worry about not being able to travel, but think of the horrors that people go through because they can not find pharmaceutical products to treat cancer, or diabetes or even simple antibiotics for infections. Or think about not having parts for diagnostic machines.

And if the Government is not paying either of them, it is because it does not have the money for either of them. Period. It is not even trying to choose one sector over the other, it is paying none of the debts. In fact, this week PDVSA announced with “bombos y platillos” (drum rolls and cymbals) lines of credit with three oil service companies. These are really no new lines of credit, they are simply converting the money PDVSA already owes these companies into formal lines of credit, so as not to affect the balance sheets of these companies that are owed money.

And the longer the Government tries to stretch it, the worse it will be in the end. The numbers just don’t add up. Unfortunately, the future is bleak for Venezuelans, unless oil dramatically jumps up. Oil has saved the day before, but this looks unlikely at this time.

Adjust accordingly.

Another PDVSA bond…

May 18, 2014

bonos-PDVSA-2024

This week, PDVSA announced yet another bond to be issued in the international markets. This time, a 6% coupon bond which matures in 2024, will pay one third of it in 2022, one third in 2023 and the final maturity in 2024. This is not your usual bond issue, PDVSA said that it would sell it to Government-owned public banks (which I take it includes the Venezuelan Central Bank) in exchange for Bolívars. And just like everything the revolution does, things get complicated, because with the many exchange rates in existence in Venezuela, the only thing we can be sure about is that it will not be sold at the parallel market rate, but one of the three rates sponsored by the Government, the Cencoex rate (Bs. 6.3 per US$) the Sicad 1 rate (Bs. 10 per US$) and the Sicad 2 rate ( Bs. 49.99 per US$ or some silly number similar to it, with decimals and everything)

You see, legally, PDVSA can not sell this bond at any rate different than the Bs. 6.3 per US$ rate to the Government owned commercial banks. That is what the foreign exchange agreements between the Government and the Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV) say. Under those agreements, PDVSA can sell dollars either at Bs. 6.3 per US$ or at Sicad 2, where it can sell dollars that did not come from producing oil. But clearly, this is not the case, PDVSA will not sell the bonds directly to Sicad 2, which is what it would need to do.

Thus, at first glance, it would seem as if the bonds will be sold to the banks at the Cencoex rate. Of course, Chavismo can simply ignore the law, it would not be the first time.

Now, PDVSA or the Government did not say anything else about the plans for this bond. Because, among many theories, the bonds could be sold in Sicad 1, Sicad 2 or they could be given by Cencoex to sell to those importers that are owed money from 2013. In all hypothetical cases, the bonds will be sold differently. For Cencoex, an importer would have to accept a discount. You see, the bond pays 6% per year, but Venezuela bonds trade at roughly a yield to maturity of say, 13%  around 2024, so that the bond in US$, if sold today, would trade around 60% of its face value. This means, that if someone was paid with it, they would only receive 60% of its nominal value.

I don’t know many importers which would accept such an offer, but you never know…

(It also means that the 30% payment to importers would go down to 18%, not an effective solution in my book to this problem)

Now, suppose you are a Government-owned bank and your bank is given US$ 50 million at Bs. 6.3 per US$. If you sell it at the Sicad 1 rate, you will get Bs. 10 per US$ nominal value. Your bank makes a tidy Bs. 3.7 per US$, you bought at Bs. 6.3, you sell at Bs. 10.  That is a nice 58% profit for doing nothing.

But there is a better deal. If you sell the bonds in the Sicad 2 system, you will sell the cash value of the bonds (60% of nominal value) at Bs. 50 or an effective Bs. 30 per US$ that you purchased for Bs. 6.3 per US$. That is a Bs. 23.7 profit per US$, almost 400%… (Who cares about decimals, no?)

Only in Venezuela…

So, what’s a bank’s President to do? Supposedly, they will follow orders, to sell x per cent in Sicad 1 or y per cent in Sicad 2. But do you really believe that this uncoordinated, mismanaged, every-man-for-himself Government will or can keep track on what happens to all these bonds? I don’t. I think there is an order to sell in Sicad 1, but soon every bank will do whatever it pleases its President, not Ramirez or Maduro.

But think about it. PDVSA, the issuer of the bond, is getting little benefit from it. It now has more debt at US$ 48 billion, but the apparent beneficiaries of the bond are the local banks and the BCV that sell it into Sicad 1 or Sicad 2. Moreover, PDVSA is issuing it with such a low coupon, that even if it is a bond issued only to satisfy the bizarre foreign exchange system of this Government, it only really generates about US$ 3 billion out of a US$ 5 billion issue in real money that can be used by importers.

But it does little to help PDVSA with its investments or its huge (and increasing!) debt with the Venezuelan Central Bank. Nor dos it help the company in its investments needs, it only allows the revolution’s stupid and increasingly dumb and complex foreign exchange system to survive a little longer.

In fact, think about it, PDVSA seems to be more worried about annual coupon payments, taking a 50% discount on it with the low coupon, than in the final payments in ’22, ’23 and ’24, which only take a 40% cut. Maybe they are not even sure they will be around to pay at that time,  and are throwing another Hail Mary pass at the revolution’s survival.

And thus PDVSA becomes the oil company with the second highest debt in the world (after Pemex) except that the money is in Bolívars and will have little impact on PDVSA’s production, as the debt is only being issued to help the revolution survive.

As to the debt, PDVSA’s or Venezuela’s, it has gone up too much for my taste.Foreign investors really believe there is some form of pragmatism in Maduro’s Government. If Ramirez is the pragmatist, God help Venezuela! I don’t think Venezuela or PDVSA needs to default, but you never know with these guys. I would wait again until yields get to 18% or so before buying. The bonds could lose 15% again at anytime like they did in February, given the Government’s policies. To get that risk and volatility, I have to get paid, 13% yield just does not cut it. There will be a good buying opportunity, Argentina does seem to have real pragmatists to park the money in the meantime.

Venezuela’s Dictatorship No Longer Cares About Appearances

May 13, 2014

camp3

For two and a half months, the Venezuelan Government had been extremely careful with the students and their protests. While it was aggressive and repressive at attacking those protesting in the streets, it had been respectful of the student camps set up in various parts of Caracas and other cities. The strategy by the students had been clever, they could not be accused of being violent, while camping near where many of the protests were taking place, allowing them to “feed” into the protests and retreat back to the camps when required. Moreover, the camps were in front of the United Nations in one case and near the OAS in the other. It seemed improbable that a Government involved in an internationally mediated dialogue would attack the camps. It would simply damage the image of the Government and tell the world what an outlaw Government Maduro’s has become.

Except it did not work out that way. Instead, the Government or someone decided to attack and raid the student’s camps. And the raids had many surprises:

-It was a military operation led by the Minister of the Interior Rodriguez Torres.

-It was an illegal raid, as the Prosecutors office was not only not informed, but had no representatives present at the raid, as required by law.

-The military raid arrested everyone in the camps, those sleeping on the streets and/or the sidewalks, with no legal justification for those that were simply protesting, without blocking the way, as guaranteed by the Constitution.

-Students were held incommunicado for longer than twenty four hours, without the Government releasing their names, allowing them calls or legal representation while they were mostly accused as a group, without being individually charged.

-The students were all subjected to drug tests, without any legal reason for it. In fact, only a small number were found to have traces of drugs.

-Minister Rodriguez Torres, who acted as prosecutor, policeman, investigator and judge in the operation, accused the students of being armed, despite them not using weapons once, including the night of the raid. Contrast this with the paramilitary groups who support the Government are usually seen publicly with their weapons.

-Most students were eventually released, those that were kept in prison were simply accused of “leading” the protests via intelligence evidence gathered prior to the raid. There is nothing illegal about being a leader of a protest.

While all of this is going on, Maduro keeps trying to talk dialogue, while Diosdado Cabello makes wild accusations against opposition figures, many of which are members of human rights ONG’s or are involved in the dialogue process.

So, can anyone understand what is going on here?

Well, I am not sure I can and that is why I have been silent on the whole process for so long, because the change in strategy not only took me by surprise, but I truly did not believe the Government would go and frontally attack the students like it did.

The question is whether the Government changed its thinking and decided on a new strategy, or whether this was an individual act by Rodriguez Torres. Or whether there is agreement on which strategy to follow.

My interpretation is that this was not a unified strategy, but that Rodriguez Torres acted on his own, after many discussions not leading to anything within the Government.

The camps had actually been quite successful. Within the Government there were, and are, large divergences on to how to handle them. Not doing anything was to many simply a sign of weakness. Doing something was an act of future intimidation to others, which was badly needed. While Maduro favors the dialogue that he agreed to internationally, he also believes that intimidating the opposition is the way to go, while Diosdado does not believe in the dialogue at all.

Thus, Rodriguez Torres acted on his own or tried not to involve Maduro in the whole operation as a way of having the President save face, and his image, while at the same time acting in the intimidating fashion that he had always favored. As the leading enforcer of the Dictatorship, Rodriguez Torres cares little about appearances, as his raid clearly demonstrated, while defending the empty revolution is all he cares about.

Meanwhile Maduro can welcome the Foreign Ministers arriving on Thursday and argue that he was unaware of the plan as there had been no agreement on strategy, but the protests had created an untenable position for him.

Of course,the raid and the way in which it was carried out completely (and finally!) destroys the image that Chavismo has tried to build and defend over the years of a democratic Government, respectful of the rights of others, while twisting and perverting the laws and its interpretations to have its way. To the UN, it was an unexpected slap in the face. And now Maduro will try to blame the break in the dialogue to the intolerant opposition, something that the Unasur mediators are unlikely to buy, but Chavismo believes that it can sell anything to what they think are the naive Foreign Ministers of Unasur. (After all, they have so far)

Unfortunately, this bodes badly for the Venezuelan opposition, whether students, MUD, anti-MUD, pro-Salida or whatever. Rodriguez Torres stepped over the line and got away with it. Next time he will push further. And the one after that even further.

Dictatorships are like that. They push the line and then they push it again, until they find themselves at a point where human rights abuses and appearances are simply irrelevant. Where the important thing is, as Rodriguez Torres said, the survival of the Bolivarian revolution, however failed it may be. And if next time it requires jailing dozens of opposition politicians, so be it. Or killing a few dozen protesters. Oh well! they were being too violent. An explanation will be found and we don’t care if you don’t believe us, we are a sovereign country.

There are too many games being played at once within Chavismo, that of appearing as a Democratic Government respectful of others, is simply no longer a priority. Human rights are simply not a priority for the revolution. Not even the appearance of respect for them. Neither are the students, the universities or the young.

You have been warned!

Venezuela: Where Is The Money? (¿Donde están los reales?)

May 7, 2014

As foreign analysts talk up the “pragmatism” of the current Venezuelan Government and Venezuela and PDVSA bonds soar, one has to wonder where the money is. After all, with shortages and inflation at an all time high, you would think this “pragmatic” Government would make a huge effort to reduce shortages by giving our foreign currency to importers to guarantee supply.

In my mind, the moment is now, not 2015. With the Government’s popularity at 21%, this is the time to adjust an really  be pragmatic. Instead, the only “pragmatism” has been that the Sicad 2 rate was higher than anyone expected. The rest, is so far wishful thinking, from currency unification, to any increase in the price of gas.

It is a case of “Show me the money”. So far, I have seen very little.

Thus, bonds go up on three acts of faith:

-The Government is “pragmatic”

-Oil will not go down in price.

-The parallel funds have the money the Government says

(And there is a corollary: The political cost of defaulting is too high. Ummm, I have heard that before: The political cost of firing 20,000 PDVSA workers is too high. The political cost of jailing Leopoldo Lopez is too high and so on and so forth, you get the idea)

Meanwhile, let’s look back at Cadivi approvals  for imports in 2012 (no data for 2013):

2012The important numbers here is that in 2012, the Government gave importers in twelve months US$ 18.18 billion  or US$ 77.7 million per day.

Well, today, Cencoex released the number for the first four months of the year, and this is the same data for imports:

CencoexWell, this 2.827 billion in four months for imports, which is equivalent to US$ 8.481 per year, substantially below the US$ 18.2 billion of 2012. And if you think Sicad 1 or 2 explains this, let me remind you Sitme was around in 2012 at daily average levels near or above Sicad 1 and Sicad 2 combined so far this year.

That is a factor of over two difference. So, if you have felt the shortages this year, the quantitative explanation is right there: A third of the money, a third of the goods.  And shortages, of course, create inflation, as there is too much money chasing too few goods.

So, if the Government has so much money in the parallel funds and if oil is high and you have become ¨pragmatic¨, why not use it? What are you waiting for?

For the Government to reach 10% in popularity? Really?

Which only leads to the question Luis Herrera used to ask: ¿Donde están los reales? (Where is the money?)

I have absolutely no idea, it may not even exist…

Tales Of Bolivarian Inefficiency IV: Puerto Cabello’s Bermuda-like Triangle

May 3, 2014

One of the nice things about having faithful readers, is that I sort of get copies of videos, documents and papers (like this one) making sure that I seldom miss important stuff. Sure I get stuff twice or even more times, but it is an incredible source of information, so thank you all. Once in a while, readers write to tell me stories, many of which I would not know about in detail if it were not for them. Sometimes, these become a post. This is one of them.

Chavismo thinks that it can hide incompetence and inefficiency. But modern tools are pretty incredible. Chavismo also seems to believe that it can do anything, run any enterprise. Their infinite belief in the power of the State and their own ability is simply scary. Take imports. In its war against the private sector Chávez began importing stuff from all over, just to bypass the local private sector. In his mind, if there is no toilet paper, or corn, or wheat, it is just a matter of importing the stuff and magically, it will show up in the shelves of local stores.

Except in reality, the path is an extreme adventure in inefficiency. It starts with how much is paid for the stuff, as there are bribes and commissions at each step. Then, there is the problem of what to bring. Some bureaucrat in Caracas decides to import paper towels and corn and, in a few weeks, people are using the towels in lieu of toilet paper and making corn bread because there is no wheat.

Except that it is not even that easy, because to get stuff from say, Brazil, to the Venezuelan consumer, the stuff has to go through the Puerto Cabello Bermuda-like triangle, where ships don’t disappera, but they do get lost for a while:

Bolipuertos

You see the port responds to the whims of Chavismo, as it is run by Bolipuertos, which is 49% owned by Asport, the Cuban port authority. This is not an easy fact to dig out, as they try to hide it deep in the webpages, but go to slide 22 of this page, and it is clearly spelled out.

This means that if it is May Day, like yesterday, many of the dock workers are bussed to Caracas to participate in the Maduro march. That means tough traffic to get in and out of the port, little unloading and almost no cargo going in or out.

But Puerto Cabello is like a Bermuda triangle, where ships get lost in time, as they arrive, spend weeks and months waiting and then too much time unloading. And time, my friends, means cost and money for everyone involved.

What my friend and reader taught  me (let’s call him DD) is that in the maritime world you can’t hide. Each ship carries  an AIS (Automatic Identification System) which is sort like the black box that airplanes have, allowing all ships to be tracked. There are websites like this one or this one, where you can follow each step of what is going on. I actually subscribed to the first one for a while ,so I could go back 60 days and follow the ships. In fact, you can even add alerts to keep track of ships.

This, for example, is an overview of the part of the Caribbean where Puerto Cabello is from the first site I linked to:

marinetraffic1

The first thing you note is how much movement and density of ships there is near Aruba and Curacao (Ships moving look like little arrows, rather than diamonds, which are vessels that are not moving), while around Venezuela everything is so static. (If you go to the webpage, you can even tell how fast the ship is moving by putting your mouse on it). Obviously, comparing the size of the three economies, you would expect much more movement and density around Puerto Cabello. But such are the ways of the revolution…

In fact, you can zoom in and see how little movement there is inside the port itself  (Colors are what type of ship it is, tanker, (red), cargo (green), passenger (blue), etc.):

marinetraffic2

You can dig even deeper, blowing up the port to the level of street detail, if you know the port, then you know where the grain elevators are, for example. Thus, if you know your stuff, you can tell what type of ship is at each spot, even if the system tells you most of the time.

Here is a detailed picture of  what was going on in Puerto Cabello, yesterday May 2nd. 2015:

Maritime3

In fact, you can click on any of the ships and you can get all sorts of information on each ship. For example, if you click on the second green ship below the point in the middle, you get this window:

ship

Note that you can check out the vessel’s track, history, itinerary. And in vessel details you can get even more pictures and find out this ship came from Norfolk Virginia, for example. If you are subscribed, then you can see when it arrived in Puerto Cabello, when it went to port and the like.

And here is where you find that Puerto Cabello has become almost like the Bermuda triangle: Companies send ships in, but they never know when they will come back. First, they arrive at port and have to wait for weeks, sometimes months, to get into the port to unload the cargo. As an example, last November, the 27th. to be exact, the M/V UBC Toronto left New Orleans loaded with corn. The trip takes about 8 days. Thus, it should have arrived in Puerto Cabello  around December 8th., the 9th., at most.

Well, on February 24th. this ship was still sitting in the same spot outside Puerto Cabello, waiting to be unloaded. We are talking more than seventy days later! It finally left Venezuela at the end of March (I did not follow its course and my subscription expired!), arriving back in the States on April 9th. that is a four month trip, for something that should only take three weeks, two traveling and one unloading.

This not only costs money, days inside the port cost on average US$ 15,000 per day, but think about it, this ship was loaded with corn at a time that Venezuelans are experiences shortages in Harina Pan to make their arepas!

Chavista management is clearly an oxymoron…

There was another ship, which arrived right before last Christmas, which was unable to go into port to unload until after two weeks anchored at sea. Well, this ship was still in Puerto Cabello unloading at the end of February, more than 8 weeks later. And it did not leave until the first week in March, which means that at $16,000 per day for roughly 60 days, the trip cost an additional US$ 960,000 for the trip.

Guess who pays for this?

So add it all up. In most of the world, workers unload, on average, about 5,000 Tons per day, from a vessel with peak rates of about 10,000 Tons in very efficient operations. In Venezuela, with luck, you may get to 1,000 Tons per day, but rates can be about half that much. This adds costs from US$ 10,000 per day, all the way up to US$ 20,000 per day, for up to two or three months. Given that a shipment may be worth US$ 10 to 12 million, this becomes a very expensive proposition. (Not to mention graft, overprice, commissions and the like)

Add it all up. This is the cost of the ports being under the inefficient Chavista management, under the advise of Cuban consultants, which not only charge for it, but turn out to own 49% of the company running the ports (They probably paid nothing for it). And, of course, being in charge of the port is juicy business, with Generals or whatever their rank may be, fighting for the top spot regularly (Last year, the port had four different Heads, with each new one requiring to learn the job from scratch, They probably never did, except to learn at which step you could charge something)

There are many other stories surrounding this. DD told me how a ship used in the oil business, costs about US$ 400,000 per day rental, US$ 230,000 if not in use. Just bringing it to Venezuela, if it is in Europe, for example, costs about US$ 2 million. Well, one such ship was brought to Venezuela last year from Europe. By the end of March it was still there, sitting around, doing nothing.

Chavista inefficiency at its best!

Meanwhile, maritime operators tremble at the thought of having to send a vessel to Puerto Cabello. It is the Bermuda triangle backwards. Your ship always disappears when it goes into the area, you just don’t know when it will reappear!

And these guys think hey can keep doing this!

(Thanks to DD for the tip and the info)