The Devil's Excrement

This week Bloomberg published a story entitled “A mystery bond in Venezuela has traders scratching their heads“, which immediately was picked up by everyone and the news of this supposed “mystery” spread. What is interesting, is that there was really no mystery. Bloomberg itself had published a story on January 27th. 2015, some 15 months ago, entitled “PDVSA sold $3b of 2022 bonds to Venezuela Cen Bank in ’14”, reporting the issuing of the bond, as described in PDVSA’s January 2015 debt report.

This bond was much like many other bonds issued by PDVSA and sold to the Central bank, as well as Government owned banks and later used to be sold at the time in the Sicad market, which was mostly fed with these bonds. It just simply was not used because conditions changed.

So, what happened? Why did people not notice? Why are people surprised?

Simply put, since the Central Bank never sold it, people barely paid attention to it and they simply forgot it existed.

The true story is that people were quite aware at the time of this bond. There is no mystery, no surprise. What happened was that the bond was sold to the Central Bank, which intended to sell it into SICAD. The day the bond was issued, the other PDVSA 2022 bond with a 12.75% coupon had a yield to maturity of 15% and traded at roughly 70%-80%. Thus, the no-mystery bond would need to trade at 60% of its value to have an equivalent yield to maturity. That was the plan, sell the bond at the “official rate” in the SICAD market and the buyer would get about 60% the face value of the bond when it sold it.

Except that bond prices collapsed, as oil melted down in the ensuing weeks, as shown in the following plot for the PDVSA 2022 with the high coupon:

In the weeks following the issuing of the bond the PDVSA 2022 12.75% bond dropped from almost 80% of its value to below 40% of its value in the blink of an eye, its yield soaring to 30%. This meant that the Central Bank would have to sell the new bond in the SICAD system at a price of only 32-33%, almost half of what it had planned. Thus, the Central Bank shelved the bond, did not use it and people just forgot or were sloppy and did not read PDVSA’s debt report. But it was always there, Bloomberg had it in its database since the end of January and if you kept a tally of PDVSA’s debt, you knew that PDVSA’s debt rose in 2014 by US$ 3.2 billion, despite paying US$ 3 billion for the PDVSA 2014 in October of that year. This only happened precisely because the non-mystery bond was issued.

And much like the paradox of whether a tree falls in the forest, does it really fall if nobody is there to watch it fall, you have to wonder if then a bond exists if nobody pays attention to it.

Any trader surprised by the appearance of this bond was simply sloppy in following PDVSA and what the Government was doing at the time and why. There is no mystery, simply put, in 2014 the Central Bank was not willing to sell the bond at 30% of its value as bond and oil prices dropped, but with the current dramatic scarcity of US dollars in the country, it is now supposedly willing to do so.

As simple as that.

Note added: A good friend tells me that the whole thing started because all of a sudden Bloomberg gave the bond a price on March 22nd., however I haven’t been able to find anyone that has traded it….

                                                             The Devil met the Devil on his vacation

Yes, I have been away, I went as far as Tasmania, where the Devil had the chance to meet the Devil (above) a gentle creature compared to Venezuelan politicians, all of which seemed to go away for Semana Santa (on both sides of the equation) And as Venezuela deteriorates, the stories are either static on important issues or making you wonder what the hell politicians are thinking.

One of the few things to change was the price of oil, which bounced back over 50% from its bottom. Yes, it is only at US$39 for WTI as I write this, but that is an extra US$ 10 billion than what it was at the bottom in February, which certainly works in the Government’s favor. It also works against those that think that the strategy is to wait out the deterioration, rather than take the initiative, a strategy that seems to be the main one, as the National Assembly will be in session again tomorrow and the only topic for discussion will be “the Pope’s exhortation for dialogue and peace in Venezuela”.

Go Figure!

And speaking of deterioration, the level at the Guri dam is 245 meters plus a few centimeters, as the Government admits that giving the whole country a week’s vacation during Easter, did not provide the benefits expected, something that could have been predicted by anyone with a little knowledge of the matter. People went home, turned on the air conditioners and TV full blast, using almost as much electricity as if they had been going to work. Much like so many other things that did not have the expected effect in the last 17 years, but Chavismo insists in running the country by the seat of their pants.

Meanwhile, there was a serious report today from Merril Lynch that the National Assembly would propose a Bill that contemplates, among other things, to recognize the debt the Government has with the private sector issuing US$ 23.6 billion in new Sovereign bonds, which would represent an increase by 75% of the country’s debt. Why this would be (could be?) a priority in the midst of the current crisis is beyond me, as such an act would have to be included in an overall economic plan/adjustment, but seems kamikaze-like as an isolated measure given the shortage of foreign currency in 2016. Bonds need to be paid, something the AN seems to not be considering in this proposal.

Meanwhile pro-Chavismo General Rodriguez Torres comes out and publicly backs a Constitutional Amendment to shorten the Presidential period and limit the Presidential term, the first openly Chavista leader to back such a proposal. He also supported the possibility of a recall referendum, calling it part of the Constitution that Chavismo proposed and saying that if the opposition gathers the required signatures, Chavismo should not fear it.

Maybe the opposition should just convince many Chavistas to come out in favor of this position, rather than act in such a timid manner so far in proposing new laws that confront the Executive and Legislative branches.

So, not much happened in Venezuela in the last few weeks. It did not rain, as the Government seemed to be resigned to the possibility of shutting down Guri if necessary. Meanwhile the opposition appears to be banking on the strategy that “God’s time is perfect” and somehow the economic/electric/political crisis will be Maduro’s demise. But somehow, I get the feeling that Chavismo only cares about its own survival and if it can reach January 10th. 2017 in power, it will get  rid of Maduro and complete his Presidential term.

Which makes the Devil above a gentle creature, compared to the usually devilish plans of Chavismo.

People in Caracas were rightly encouraged last week when the city got some rain. Stories about the Guri Dam reaching critical level have been scaring people for the last two weeks. Unfortunately, as you can see in the rain map above from Monday March 14th. at 1 AM, the rain that poured over the city is nowhere to be seen now. In fact, that rain seemed to come from the Caribbean and did not make a dent on Guri Dam, which the map notes. There is some rainy activity south of the dam in Amazonas state, but it is too far, while it is hopeful to see some.

The question is how bad the problem is or may become. To explain this, I resort to slides I showed in 2010 when a similar threat was present.

Reportedly, the level of the dam is now at 247.5 meters. Within this range, each day without rain implies a drop of 30 cm today, but will accelerate as it drops. The minimum level at which the dam may operate is 240 m. as seeing in the following slide:

What the slide shows is that the minimum level of operation occurs below 240 meters. Below this level, a number of problems begin to take place in which the turbines do not operate well (Cavitation and turbulence). According to the slide, below this level, eight of the turbines (some of which, in red, are not operational, will not work, taking out 5,600 MW of power out of the country´s network. This is about half what Guri can produce and Guri provides 60% of the power in the country. Thus, at this level, we are talking about losing 30% of the power of the country and , of course, the water level could keep dropping.

A more detailed plot of the problems is shown in the following plot (Both plots are official ones from Government’s electrical institutions):

As you can see, slightly below 240 meters, vortices will form and the turbines will have to be stopped. We are talking about 9 meters below current level.

Well, we are close, but the drought will have to last some 46 days, according to predictions made in this post in the comments by a reader in 2010.

This means that we are talking about end of April before in the critical area. Thus, while we have reasons to be concerned, the critical level is still far from where we are, as rains seem to be beginning to appear in the south of Venezuela. The weather is unpredictable, but a catastrophe is still far away and may not happen. Will keep you informed.

Graph added:

Someone sent me this plot. The slope at which it drops is 12-13 cm per day, which is a positive as it gives more time (70 days to be more precise) :

One of the multiple maps pointing to the location of El Dorado

When I was an elementary school student, I always admired how the natives of South America invented and propagated the Legend of El Dorado in order to distract and mislead the Conquistadores. Not only did they succeed, but they did it for centuries, deceiving well learned and well educated men and inducing expeditions from Venezuela to Peru, looking for this mythical place of wealth and riches. The myth was developed so well, that there are many maps like the one above, purporting to indicate where El Dorado was located. Even Humboldt took some time away from his erudite pursuits to look for El Dorado in Guyana, to say nothing of Sir Walter Raleigh.

All of this comes to mind, because the saga of the Las Cristinas mine in Bolívar State, seems to be turning into a sort of Legend of El Dorado, except backwards, as the announcements surrounding the mine seemed oriented more towards dazzling and distracting the natives and expropriating foreigners, than about producing gold.

The story starts from what I understand, in the sixties, when the wife of one of the people that helped Jimmy Angel explore Venezuela’s Guyana region, obtained a mining concession to exploit Las Cristinas. The concession was the subject of numerous lawsuits, until the concession ran out.

From here, the story is clearer, Canada’s Placer Dome, signed an agreement with the Corporación Venezolana de Guayana (CVG) in 1990 or 1991, whereby Placer Dome would exploit the mine and give some percentage of the profits to CVG.

But then Crystallex, another Candian company claimed to have a concession to part of the mine, which stopped the project and later forced Placer Dome to sell rights to the mine for US$50, according to lore, when gold dropped in price to a company named Vanessa Ventures. The Government was not happy and expropriated Las Cristinas, giving it back to CVG.

Then in 2002, the Chávez Government awarded the mine to Crystallex and Vanessa sued the Government at the World’s Bank ICSID arbitration panel in Washington DC. But it was not until 2007 that Crystallex satisfied all of the requirements of the Government, including an Environmental Impact Statement and posting the bond required by CVG. But the Government denied the permit, despite all of the legal authorizations and approvals being present. Crystallex also sued in the World Bank’s ICSID arbitration Court.

In 2011, the Chávez Government nationalized the gold industry, prompting Rusoro, which exploited the El Callao mines and Gold Reserve, which had the rights to the Las Brisas mine to sue the Government at the ICSID.

In 2012, the Chávez Government assigned China’s CITIC to the rights to develop Las Cristinas (So much for reserving it for the Government two years earlier).

Don’t know what type of contracts or agreements were signed with the Chinese, if any.

As far as I know, the only company that produced any important amount of gold in all these years was Rusoro, which reportedly produced close to 100,000 ounces in 2010.

 So, much like the mythical El Dorado, Las Cristinas, El Callao, Las Brisas have all been but a myth, Venezuela has huge gold deposits, but other than illegal miners, and Rusoro for a while, not many ounces have come out it.

You can say that the politicians have turned it into a myth to defend sovereignty, promote the idea that Venezuela is rich and soon we will be even richer. Except that very little has happened.

And a new chapter in the myth was born last week, when, after Gold Reserve had won its suit at the ICSID and any Court in the world that was needed to enforce an award of US$ 740 million plus interest, that the Minister of Mines and President of PDVSA announced an MOU (Memorandum of Understanding, a piece of paper in which we agree to sign a contract, if we agree again later on the details) with Gold Reserve that apparently settles the case.

Or does it? Or did we just see a new El Dorado legend just being born?

Because this week, the Government issued a somewhat confusing MOU with Gold Reserve claiming:

-A joint venture with Gold Reserve (45%) and the Government (55%) will be created.

-The project “implies” and investment of US$ 5 billion in a win-win relationship

-The MOU puts and end to the legal situation at the ICSID.

-The investment in the project includes US$ 2 billion for the exploitation of the mine and US$ 2 billion in loans to the country, as well as the resources to get the company going.

Then the shares of Gold Reserve were suspended from trading, awaiting for the company’s interpretation of the agreement, which came out yesterday, in which the company said:

-They have signed an MOU with Venezuela that contemplates settlement, including payment and resolution, of the arbitral award of the ICSID.

-Venezuela would proceed with payment of the Award including accrued interest and enter transactional (settlement) and mixed company (“joint venture”) agreements, which are expected to be executed in approximately 60 days.

– It is anticipated that Venezuela, with the Company’s assistance, would work to complete the financing to fund the contemplated payments to the Company pursuant to the Award and for its mining data and $2 billion towards the anticipated capital costs of the Brisas-Cristinas Project. Upon payment, the Company will cease all legal activities related to the collection of the Award.

-The Brisas and Cristinas properties, together with the technical data with respect to the Brisas project owned by Gold Reserve, would be transferred to a Venezuelan mixed company, which is expected to be beneficially owned 55% by Venezuela and 45% by Gold Reserve

The differences are clear: First of all, Gold Reserve gets both Las Cristinas and Las Brisas, not just Las Brisas, which was the mine they sued for. Second, “Upon payment, the Company will cease all legal activities” and third, Gold Reserve will provide only “assistance” to obtain the funding. No more, no less.

But many people read all of this like a new El Dorado legend: Venezuela will get a US$ 2 billion loan, we have huge gold reserves, we are going to produce gold like crazy. And Gold Reserve will produce all this.

We shall see, but I doubt it.

A new El Dorado legend is born, but this time aimed at distracting mostly the locals, rather than the invaders…just like El Dorado, but turned backwards.

Note added on March 2nd.: The only way this could receive financing, in the absence of financials and an ongoing concern, is that Gold Reserve will “facilitate” transferring the 45% rights to the Chinese in exchange for US$ 2 billion loan to the Venezuelan Government and/or the project.