The Devil's Excrement

When the CNE first reported the proposed methodology for the ratification process of the signatures, the opposition said that there were ten technical problems that would make the ratification process difficult for those that signed in the Reafirmazo. According to opposition sources six of those ten have been resolved and only four are inadequate for the Coordinadora Democratica.

What the CNE has done is to continue its string of tricks to make the ratification process as insurmountable as possible. In the same way that tricks were used to disqualify or place under observation a sufficiently large number of signatures, tricks are being used now to make the ratification process as difficult as possible.

Any rational person would argue that the ratification process should differ little from the process used in gathering the signatures. After all, any electoral authority always has as its main objective to facilitate the ability of the voters to express their opinion, not the other way around. In that peculiar logic of the Bolivarian revolution, this is not the case. Paraphrasing Francisco Toro’s article today, there is nothing Aristotelian about the logical process being followed by the CNE for the ratification process.

One can begin from the regulations issued in September for the ratification process. Such regulations clearly state that the process would use up five days. Now, five days is five days, not three, but using that incredible ability to make matters gray and wishy washy, the CNE has announced that the first day will be used for setting up the polling booths and the last one to dismantle them. Thus, in true Chavista magic trick fashion five becomes three but it is five. On the last day, people may go to regional centers which are few and far between, but the almost three thousand centers will be closed. Trick #1.

At the next level you have the number of centers to be used, the opposition finally managed to convince the CNE to use the same number of polling centers used in the Reafirmazo process, something that seems absolutely logical, but was quite a sticky point for quite a while. Originally, the CNE had proposed as many as a fourth of that number. Thus, the opposition managed to convince the CNE to stick to the same number. However, the centers will not be located at the same place where people signed during the Reafirmazo. Why? Since the process will be managed and controlled by the CNE, the centers will be the usual electoral centers used in elections and not the improvised polling booths used by the opposition in gathering the signatures. This will confuse people quite a bit. Trick #2.

In the Reafirmazo, signatures were gathered manually originating the huge problem (or trick) with the signatures with the same calligraphy. This time around, there will be electoral books in which the data for each person that has a valid signature or a signature that needs to be ratified will be included. However, in addition to this, there will be a PC with communications where the same data (we hope!) entered into the electoral books, will be entered by CNE operators. As we will see the presence of these PC’s becomes Tricks’ #3 and Tricks #4.

First of all, the CNE argues that it can not purchase the number of laptops the opposition wants. What the opposition has done is to calculate how long it would take for everyone whose signature has problems to go and attempt to ratify their signature. Their answer is that the 3000 centers are sufficient, but you would need an average of thee PC’s per center in order to process every one of them. The CNE refuses to give in on this point. They argue that the written forms have created such a problem that they want to have a parallel mechanism of cross-checking what is in the books. They also argue they don’t have the money to buy the 10,000 laptops that would be required to satisfy the opposition. Given that the CNE will run the process there seems to be no justification for this. If CNE workers will ask the person to show their national ID card in order to sign, how could anyone cheat on these books? Trick #3.

Once Trick #3 is in place, it automatically rules out the possibility of having itinerant volunteers visiting those that signed using the itinerant process, since it is not possible to have these people carry laptops all over the place. This is a very important point because while only 15% of the signatures were itinerant, most of the itinerant signature gatherers in the Reafirmazo, who visited those that could not go to the polling places either because they were sick or because they were intimidated, filled out the forms with the data for those signing. Thus, most of these close to 500,000 signatures are in the same calligraphy or “plana” category. This is actually a two pronged trick, first those that can’t go, can’t possibly ratify. Secondly, those that can go, have no idea to what polling station they have to go. Estimates are that only 25% of the itinerant forms that were invalidated may be ratified. Trick #4.

So these are the bad news, four tricks that make it quite difficult for the ratification process to be successful. The process is designed to satisfy only a fraction of those that could attend. However, there is also some good news that also needs to be taken into account:

-The number of signatures that the CNE has validated has apparently climbed once again above 1.9 million making the task easier for the opposition. Originally, CNE President Carrasquero had announced that more than 1.9 million signatures were valid, but the number was down by almost one hundred thousand signatures in the first database handed out to the opposition, but reportedly is up again the second database.

-The number of signatures that can be ratified has also climbed above 1.3 million above the initial value of 1.2 million.

-The estimate is that the Government will not be too successful in its efforts to have people that did sign go and say they did not. Estimates suggest that the number will likely be around 60,000 in the worst case scenario.

-Polls suggest that 85% of those that signed say they want to participate in the ratification process.

Finally, there is an additional negative: Some political parties and organizations have decided that under no circumstances the opposition should participate in the ratification process. Their help in getting the people out to the polling stations and motivating the people is definitely a negative.

These tricks are very real, those advising the Coordinadora Democrática on technical aspects may in the end tip the balance on the final decision to participate or not. If it looks like an impossible task, it will be a no go so as not to legitimize the Chavista lies, if it looks doable, the process will move forward and the opposition will try to get the people involved and participating using numerous strategies. At this point, with the current rules, it looks feasible but marginal. There are simply too many tricks.

When the CNE first reported the proposed methodology for the ratification process of the signatures, the opposition said that there were ten technical problems that would make the ratification process difficult for those that signed in the Reafirmazo. According to opposition sources six of those ten have been resolved and only four are inadequate for the Coordinadora Democratica.

What the CNE has done is to continue its string of tricks to make the ratification process as insurmountable as possible. In the same way that tricks were used to disqualify or place under observation a sufficiently large number of signatures, tricks are being used now to make the ratification process as difficult as possible.

Any rational person would argue that the ratification process should differ little from the process used in gathering the signatures. After all, any electoral authority always has as its main objective to facilitate the ability of the voters to express their opinion, not the other way around. In that peculiar logic of the Bolivarian revolution, this is not the case. Paraphrasing Francisco Toro’s article today, there is nothing Aristotelian about the logical process being followed by the CNE for the ratification process.

One can begin from the regulations issued in September for the ratification process. Such regulations clearly state that the process would use up five days. Now, five days is five days, not three, but using that incredible ability to make matters gray and wishy washy, the CNE has announced that the first day will be used for setting up the polling booths and the last one to dismantle them. Thus, in true Chavista magic trick fashion five becomes three but it is five. On the last day, people may go to regional centers which are few and far between, but the almost three thousand centers will be closed. Trick #1.

At the next level you have the number of centers to be used, the opposition finally managed to convince the CNE to use the same number of polling centers used in the Reafirmazo process, something that seems absolutely logical, but was quite a sticky point for quite a while. Originally, the CNE had proposed as many as a fourth of that number. Thus, the opposition managed to convince the CNE to stick to the same number. However, the centers will not be located at the same place where people signed during the Reafirmazo. Why? Since the process will be managed and controlled by the CNE, the centers will be the usual electoral centers used in elections and not the improvised polling booths used by the opposition in gathering the signatures. This will confuse people quite a bit. Trick #2.

In the Reafirmazo, signatures were gathered manually originating the huge problem (or trick) with the signatures with the same calligraphy. This time around, there will be electoral books in which the data for each person that has a valid signature or a signature that needs to be ratified will be included. However, in addition to this, there will be a PC with communications where the same data (we hope!) entered into the electoral books, will be entered by CNE operators. As we will see the presence of these PC’s becomes Tricks’ #3 and Tricks #4.

First of all, the CNE argues that it can not purchase the number of laptops the opposition wants. What the opposition has done is to calculate how long it would take for everyone whose signature has problems to go and attempt to ratify their signature. Their answer is that the 3000 centers are sufficient, but you would need an average of thee PC’s per center in order to process every one of them. The CNE refuses to give in on this point. They argue that the written forms have created such a problem that they want to have a parallel mechanism of cross-checking what is in the books. They also argue they don’t have the money to buy the 10,000 laptops that would be required to satisfy the opposition. Given that the CNE will run the process there seems to be no justification for this. If CNE workers will ask the person to show their national ID card in order to sign, how could anyone cheat on these books? Trick #3.

Once Trick #3 is in place, it automatically rules out the possibility of having itinerant volunteers visiting those that signed using the itinerant process, since it is not possible to have these people carry laptops all over the place. This is a very important point because while only 15% of the signatures were itinerant, most of the itinerant signature gatherers in the Reafirmazo, who visited those that could not go to the polling places either because they were sick or because they were intimidated, filled out the forms with the data for those signing. Thus, most of these close to 500,000 signatures are in the same calligraphy or “plana” category. This is actually a two pronged trick, first those that can’t go, can’t possibly ratify. Secondly, those that can go, have no idea to what polling station they have to go. Estimates are that only 25% of the itinerant forms that were invalidated may be ratified. Trick #4.

So these are the bad news, four tricks that make it quite difficult for the ratification process to be successful. The process is designed to satisfy only a fraction of those that could attend. However, there is also some good news that also needs to be taken into account:

-The number of signatures that the CNE has validated has apparently climbed once again above 1.9 million making the task easier for the opposition. Originally, CNE President Carrasquero had announced that more than 1.9 million signatures were valid, but the number was down by almost one hundred thousand signatures in the first database handed out to the opposition, but reportedly is up again the second database.

-The number of signatures that can be ratified has also climbed above 1.3 million above the initial value of 1.2 million.

-The estimate is that the Government will not be too successful in its efforts to have people that did sign go and say they did not. Estimates suggest that the number will likely be around 60,000 in the worst case scenario.

-Polls suggest that 85% of those that signed say they want to participate in the ratification process.

Finally, there is an additional negative: Some political parties and organizations have decided that under no circumstances the opposition should participate in the ratification process. Their help in getting the people out to the polling stations and motivating the people is definitely a negative.

These tricks are very real, those advising the Coordinadora Democrática on technical aspects may in the end tip the balance on the final decision to participate or not. If it looks like an impossible task, it will be a no go so as not to legitimize the Chavista lies, if it looks doable, the process will move forward and the opposition will try to get the people involved and participating using numerous strategies. At this point, with the current rules, it looks feasible but marginal. There are simply too many tricks.

The regional elections have become a very divisive issue for the opposition. In contrast to the pro-Chávez forces where a single leader sets the path and the tone, there are dozens of different hidden and visible agendas within the opposition and its candidacies. Whether to participate or not is not an easy choice; the petition for the recall referendum represented a simple and transparent process that has become absolutely opaque in the hands of the Electoral Board. Can anyone trust a process run by these people? I certainly can’t, there have been too many tricks, too many manipulations, too many delays, all designed to stop the recall referendum against President Hugo Chavez from ever taking place.

There are many issues floating around, so I will deal with them separately so as not to mix them too much, although there are obviously intertwined:

-Too many candidates

Opposition parties have registered too many candidates for most positions up for election. This obviously shows the lack of coordination on the part of the opposition, but what else can you expect? The opposition is united by a simple goal: Removing Hugo Chavez from office. Parties in the opposition range from the Bandera Roja, an extreme left-wing party that accuses Chavez of being neo-liberal on economics, an also includes the social democrats, the social Christians, Primero Justicia a party of yuppies concentrating on delivering services to the people, the socialists who backed Chávez’ election and ends with pragmatist Enrique Mendoza, whose track record as a public manager is excellent, but has no well defined ideology.

Besides ideology, there are issues of personalities, regional rivalries and many frustrated politicians who could care less if Chavez stays or go as long as their own political careers move forward.

Finally, there is the issue of timing. While everyone was worriying about the recall referendum, all of a sudden people had to scramble to register for dozens of races across the country, with no time to negotiate agreements. In the end, many parties chose to simply register everyone they could think of and if later an agreement is found, withdraw candidates from races or specify that that party’s vote will go to a particular candidate.

Thus, it is easy to understand the various sides on the issue, from those that think that the opposition should not go to the regional elections if the recall vote is blocked, to those that registered their candidacies but are willing to withdraw it if an agreement is found.

However, we have to take our hats off to people like Andres Velasquez and Antonio Ledezma who had legitimate and valid aspirations to run, but withdrew for the sake of unity. If more people acted with their selflessness, the opposition would be way ahead in this race.

-The “living room” candidates

Venezuela has a long tradition of what I like to call “living room” politicians. These are people who sit around theoretically solving all of the problems of the country and somehow think that they have a sort of God-given right to be elected to a particular office just because they choose to run.

In fact, Hugo Chavez and Carlos Andres Perez represent the antithesis of this type of politician. Whether one likes either of them or not, they both went around Venezuela, visiting every town, village and city, shaking hands, listening to problems. This grassroots work made them extremely popular and it is no surprise that they won elections running away.

In the other extreme we have Claudio Fermin and Francisco Arias Cardenas. Fermin was AD’s Presidential candidate in 1993, after being a fairly mediocre Mayor of the Libertador District of Caracas. He came in a surprising second in the Presidential race, and proceeded to vanish from the Venezuelan political scene until the next election came around. Fermin ran for President against Chávez and Arias Cárdenas in 2000, getting less than 3% of the vote. Now, after being essentially invisible for the last four years, he is running for Metropolitan Mayor of Caracas, a position held by an opposition figure.

Fermin says he has a right to run. Of course he does! But his candidacy is not too transparent in my mind. He has not participated in any opposition activity, nor in the efforts related to the recall referendum and has appeared to be more critical of the opposition than of the Chavez administration, despite his claims. Thus, his candidacy splits the opposition, sends a confusing image and may help elect Chavista Juan Barreto as Mayor of Caracas. To me he has become a living room politician; he thinks he has a right to be elected despite his absence from the Venezuelan political scene in the last few years.

The same case can be made for Francisco Arias Cardenas. Arias Cardenas was, with Chávez, one of the leaders of the 1992 coup. He distanced himself from Chávez in 1996 because he decided that the electoral path was the correct one, which Chavze opposed. Arias ran for Governor of Zulia and did a decent job, teaming up pragmatically with then Mayor of Maracaibo and current Governor of Zulia Manuel Rosales. He later backed Chavez only to split from him when another 1992 coup leader, Jesus Urdaneta, resigned from his position as head of the political police accusing Chavez of doing nothing to fight corruption.

Arias Cardenas became the opposition candidate after the new Constitution was approved, but since then has played an extremely ambiguous role. Twice he was reportedly being considered as Vice-President by Chávez, negotiations that Arias accepted took place. Arias is running for Governor of Zulia state against popular Governor Manuel Rosales as well as the pro-Chavez candidate General Gutierrez.

Some claim that Arias is actually running with the silent support of Chávez. Chavez backed General Gutierrez, but he remains far behind in the polls in a state that is probably the most anti-Chávez of any in the country. While this can not be proven, it is also true that Arias only announced his candidacy when Gutierrez’ flopped. Like Fermin, I think Arias has the right to be a candidate, but he has also joined in my mind the ranks of the living room politicians who reappear only when there are elections. I hope the electorate ignores both of them.

-Can you spare some democracy?

In the end, the problem is that despite the claims, the reforms and the “revolution”, Venezuelan politics remain too much like those of the IVth. Republic: personalistic and Stalinistic. In the 1998 Presidential election, not one candidate was selected by a primary. They were all either self-appointed, creating a party around the candidate, like Chavez, Salas Romer or Irene Saez, or appointed by the top leaders of the party like Alfaro Ucero in AD.

Despite Chávez’ promises that he would introduce democracy to the structure of political parties, the opposite has been true. Chavez has essentially single handedly named each and every candidate for MVR in these regional elections. The opposition has done the same, except that it did run some polls in some states and decided to field only the candidate that were well ahead in the Gubernatorial races.

I have always believed that it was this lack of democracy that hurt the political parties of the IVth. Republic. Political parties became old as young people were not attracted to institutions that did not take them into account or where to get ahead you had to pay dues in the form of time and not ability or  hard work. Thus, politics became a job for the politicians; the rest of the people ignored it.

In the end, it is not a problem of the “opposition” or Chavez; it is a problem of democracy. Neither side is using very democratic means to select their candidates. Chavez picked his, leaving behind a trail of very upset candidates-to-be and parties in the opposition chose theirs, fielding too many candidates.

The solution is obvious; the opposition should hold primaries to choose a single candidate from those that have registered for each race. In doing so, it will strengthen candidacies and be able to claim that it is within the opposition where true democracy lies in Venezuela.

It is also unfair to accuse the opposition of not being democratic because it did not hold primaries. With the whole referendum controversy, it would have been a contradiction to enter the carnival atmosphere of a primary for all positions, distracting parties and candidates from the main goal: the recall referendum.

In fact, maybe Chavez should have taken the upper hand and hold primaries since his activists were not distracted. But being such a control freak and so removed from true democratic practices, it was just not an idea that he would come up with. 

The reality is that there was a lot of backlash against opposition candidates and the opposition this weekend that may push it into these primaries. Some parties have offered to hold primaries, others to poll the electorate to decide who should run, others may simply withdraw because they are not doing very well.

In the end more democracy is the only way to go. The electorate will certainly reward the opposition if it takes this road. It will also punish those that do not joint it.

-Opposition Fratricide

In more developed democracies, the fratricide which characterizes primaries and early candidacies is not always fatal. The reason is that everyone goes back to their same single party and decide that the bigger enemy is the candidate form the opposing party.

In this case, the fratricide may be more fatal than usual. For the first time in a long time, newspapers this weekend carried articles by the opposition attacking the opposition. This may cause wounds that will be difficult to heal, given the absence of no common goal other than getting rid of Hugo Chávez.

A good example is today’s Tal Cual’ Editorial against local newspaper El Universal, discussed elsewhere by Daniel. I was surprised not by the charges against El Universal, but more for how specific they were. Petkoff could have said the same thing implying it, without being so specific. I also found his defense of the existence of freedom of speech somewhat empty given the attacks on the media, the precautionary measures by the Human rights Commission of the OAS and the dead or injured reporters.  The opposition needs both newspapers on its side; it would be a pity is this escalated into a useless war of words.

This fratricide may even be worse regionally, where animosities between various groups go back decades, to fights that are almost tribal in nature. To have these groups fight it out all of a sudden may in the end create deeper division than ever.

-Opposition has the edge

In the end, the opposition has the upped hand in the regional elections. While Chavez has the money and the hardcore constituency, the opposition has the majority and the appealing regional candidates. Since it is Chávez that has hand picked most candidates, they generally do not represent the top choice of the electorate. Chavez is fielding 12 former military as candidates for Governors in the country’s 23 states. Some of them are stiff like General Gutierrez, or disliked, like general Acosta Carles, inarticulate, like Diosdado Cabello, others have been terrible as Governors, like Blanco La Cruz in Tachira.

But the biggest advantage the opposition has in the regional elections is exactly why it has problems with Chavez. Polls clearly show that at the national level people are looking for an alternative to Chavez that does not exist. This is not a problem at the regional level, in each State and each city, the opposition has more than one candidate that is attractive or at least more attractive than the rough or confrontational candidates that rode Chavez’ coattails to power five years ago. This is an incredible edge if the choice is narrowed down.

It is the opposition’s duty to do so. If it happens, the opposition could get as many as 16 out of the 23 Governorships and truly turn the regional elections into an alternative recall referendum.

The regional elections have become a very divisive issue for the opposition. In contrast to the pro-Chávez forces where a single leader sets the path and the tone, there are dozens of different hidden and visible agendas within the opposition and its candidacies. Whether to participate or not is not an easy choice; the petition for the recall referendum represented a simple and transparent process that has become absolutely opaque in the hands of the Electoral Board. Can anyone trust a process run by these people? I certainly can’t, there have been too many tricks, too many manipulations, too many delays, all designed to stop the recall referendum against President Hugo Chavez from ever taking place.

There are many issues floating around, so I will deal with them separately so as not to mix them too much, although there are obviously intertwined:

-Too many candidates

Opposition parties have registered too many candidates for most positions up for election. This obviously shows the lack of coordination on the part of the opposition, but what else can you expect? The opposition is united by a simple goal: Removing Hugo Chavez from office. Parties in the opposition range from the Bandera Roja, an extreme left-wing party that accuses Chavez of being neo-liberal on economics, an also includes the social democrats, the social Christians, Primero Justicia a party of yuppies concentrating on delivering services to the people, the socialists who backed Chávez’ election and ends with pragmatist Enrique Mendoza, whose track record as a public manager is excellent, but has no well defined ideology.

Besides ideology, there are issues of personalities, regional rivalries and many frustrated politicians who could care less if Chavez stays or go as long as their own political careers move forward.

Finally, there is the issue of timing. While everyone was worriying about the recall referendum, all of a sudden people had to scramble to register for dozens of races across the country, with no time to negotiate agreements. In the end, many parties chose to simply register everyone they could think of and if later an agreement is found, withdraw candidates from races or specify that that party’s vote will go to a particular candidate.

Thus, it is easy to understand the various sides on the issue, from those that think that the opposition should not go to the regional elections if the recall vote is blocked, to those that registered their candidacies but are willing to withdraw it if an agreement is found.

However, we have to take our hats off to people like Andres Velasquez and Antonio Ledezma who had legitimate and valid aspirations to run, but withdrew for the sake of unity. If more people acted with their selflessness, the opposition would be way ahead in this race.

-The “living room” candidates

Venezuela has a long tradition of what I like to call “living room” politicians. These are people who sit around theoretically solving all of the problems of the country and somehow think that they have a sort of God-given right to be elected to a particular office just because they choose to run.

In fact, Hugo Chavez and Carlos Andres Perez represent the antithesis of this type of politician. Whether one likes either of them or not, they both went around Venezuela, visiting every town, village and city, shaking hands, listening to problems. This grassroots work made them extremely popular and it is no surprise that they won elections running away.

In the other extreme we have Claudio Fermin and Francisco Arias Cardenas. Fermin was AD’s Presidential candidate in 1993, after being a fairly mediocre Mayor of the Libertador District of Caracas. He came in a surprising second in the Presidential race, and proceeded to vanish from the Venezuelan political scene until the next election came around. Fermin ran for President against Chávez and Arias Cárdenas in 2000, getting less than 3% of the vote. Now, after being essentially invisible for the last four years, he is running for Metropolitan Mayor of Caracas, a position held by an opposition figure.

Fermin says he has a right to run. Of course he does! But his candidacy is not too transparent in my mind. He has not participated in any opposition activity, nor in the efforts related to the recall referendum and has appeared to be more critical of the opposition than of the Chavez administration, despite his claims. Thus, his candidacy splits the opposition, sends a confusing image and may help elect Chavista Juan Barreto as Mayor of Caracas. To me he has become a living room politician; he thinks he has a right to be elected despite his absence from the Venezuelan political scene in the last few years.

The same case can be made for Francisco Arias Cardenas. Arias Cardenas was, with Chávez, one of the leaders of the 1992 coup. He distanced himself from Chávez in 1996 because he decided that the electoral path was the correct one, which Chavze opposed. Arias ran for Governor of Zulia and did a decent job, teaming up pragmatically with then Mayor of Maracaibo and current Governor of Zulia Manuel Rosales. He later backed Chavez only to split from him when another 1992 coup leader, Jesus Urdaneta, resigned from his position as head of the political police accusing Chavez of doing nothing to fight corruption.

Arias Cardenas became the opposition candidate after the new Constitution was approved, but since then has played an extremely ambiguous role. Twice he was reportedly being considered as Vice-President by Chávez, negotiations that Arias accepted took place. Arias is running for Governor of Zulia state against popular Governor Manuel Rosales as well as the pro-Chavez candidate General Gutierrez.

Some claim that Arias is actually running with the silent support of Chávez. Chavez backed General Gutierrez, but he remains far behind in the polls in a state that is probably the most anti-Chávez of any in the country. While this can not be proven, it is also true that Arias only announced his candidacy when Gutierrez’ flopped. Like Fermin, I think Arias has the right to be a candidate, but he has also joined in my mind the ranks of the living room politicians who reappear only when there are elections. I hope the electorate ignores both of them.

-Can you spare some democracy?

In the end, the problem is that despite the claims, the reforms and the “revolution”, Venezuelan politics remain too much like those of the IVth. Republic: personalistic and Stalinistic. In the 1998 Presidential election, not one candidate was selected by a primary. They were all either self-appointed, creating a party around the candidate, like Chavez, Salas Romer or Irene Saez, or appointed by the top leaders of the party like Alfaro Ucero in AD.

Despite Chávez’ promises that he would introduce democracy to the structure of political parties, the opposite has been true. Chavez has essentially single handedly named each and every candidate for MVR in these regional elections. The opposition has done the same, except that it did run some polls in some states and decided to field only the candidate that were well ahead in the Gubernatorial races.

I have always believed that it was this lack of democracy that hurt the political parties of the IVth. Republic. Political parties became old as young people were not attracted to institutions that did not take them into account or where to get ahead you had to pay dues in the form of time and not ability or  hard work. Thus, politics became a job for the politicians; the rest of the people ignored it.

In the end, it is not a problem of the “opposition” or Chavez; it is a problem of democracy. Neither side is using very democratic means to select their candidates. Chavez picked his, leaving behind a trail of very upset candidates-to-be and parties in the opposition chose theirs, fielding too many candidates.

The solution is obvious; the opposition should hold primaries to choose a single candidate from those that have registered for each race. In doing so, it will strengthen candidacies and be able to claim that it is within the opposition where true democracy lies in Venezuela.

It is also unfair to accuse the opposition of not being democratic because it did not hold primaries. With the whole referendum controversy, it would have been a contradiction to enter the carnival atmosphere of a primary for all positions, distracting parties and candidates from the main goal: the recall referendum.

In fact, maybe Chavez should have taken the upper hand and hold primaries since his activists were not distracted. But being such a control freak and so removed from true democratic practices, it was just not an idea that he would come up with. 

The reality is that there was a lot of backlash against opposition candidates and the opposition this weekend that may push it into these primaries. Some parties have offered to hold primaries, others to poll the electorate to decide who should run, others may simply withdraw because they are not doing very well.

In the end more democracy is the only way to go. The electorate will certainly reward the opposition if it takes this road. It will also punish those that do not joint it.

-Opposition Fratricide

In more developed democracies, the fratricide which characterizes primaries and early candidacies is not always fatal. The reason is that everyone goes back to their same single party and decide that the bigger enemy is the candidate form the opposing party.

In this case, the fratricide may be more fatal than usual. For the first time in a long time, newspapers this weekend carried articles by the opposition attacking the opposition. This may cause wounds that will be difficult to heal, given the absence of no common goal other than getting rid of Hugo Chávez.

A good example is today’s Tal Cual’ Editorial against local newspaper El Universal, discussed elsewhere by Daniel. I was surprised not by the charges against El Universal, but more for how specific they were. Petkoff could have said the same thing implying it, without being so specific. I also found his defense of the existence of freedom of speech somewhat empty given the attacks on the media, the precautionary measures by the Human rights Commission of the OAS and the dead or injured reporters.  The opposition needs both newspapers on its side; it would be a pity is this escalated into a useless war of words.

This fratricide may even be worse regionally, where animosities between various groups go back decades, to fights that are almost tribal in nature. To have these groups fight it out all of a sudden may in the end create deeper division than ever.

-Opposition has the edge

In the end, the opposition has the upped hand in the regional elections. While Chavez has the money and the hardcore constituency, the opposition has the majority and the appealing regional candidates. Since it is Chávez that has hand picked most candidates, they generally do not represent the top choice of the electorate. Chavez is fielding 12 former military as candidates for Governors in the country’s 23 states. Some of them are stiff like General Gutierrez, or disliked, like general Acosta Carles, inarticulate, like Diosdado Cabello, others have been terrible as Governors, like Blanco La Cruz in Tachira.

But the biggest advantage the opposition has in the regional elections is exactly why it has problems with Chavez. Polls clearly show that at the national level people are looking for an alternative to Chavez that does not exist. This is not a problem at the regional level, in each State and each city, the opposition has more than one candidate that is attractive or at least more attractive than the rough or confrontational candidates that rode Chavez’ coattails to power five years ago. This is an incredible edge if the choice is narrowed down.

It is the opposition’s duty to do so. If it happens, the opposition could get as many as 16 out of the 23 Governorships and truly turn the regional elections into an alternative recall referendum.

The battle over the forms with the same calligraphy has now moved to the Supreme Court. Both sides had asked for injunctions from the Electoral Hall. Both sides had asked the Electoral hall to recuse some of the Justices from the case. This morning the requests to be recused were rejected by the Electoral Hall, suggesting they may soon rule on the case. Well, this afternoon, the Constitutional Hall, with only three Justices present ruled that the Electoral Hall can not make a ruling on the case until the Constitutional Hall decides whether it will look at the case or not. A ruling like this requires quorum, which is made by having four Justices present. The Constitutional Hall has to invite its members three times if uorum is not achieved before it can then use alternate Justices. The question is? What will the Electoral Hall do now?

First Mars rover picture                                           Sign: Excuse us we are working hard to get rid of Chavez

In am getting lots of good pictures, some look so good they look professional, if any of you is aware that I am violating someones copyright, please let me know, I can ask for permission. Meanwhile enjoy puictures from the battlefront.

Rising from the ruble (Reuters)                                          Things go better with Molotov Coke

Opposition violence (?)                                                    Sending it back

Referendum or blood                                                   Firepower

Jose Vilas was part of the technical staff of Intevep, PDVSA’s research and development Center until a year ago when he was fired after the strike. He was one of the one thousand employees fired. He was involved in the petition drive for the referendum, leading a collection center in San Antonio de Los Altos, about 15 miles from downtown Caracas up the Panamerican highway, last December. Yesterday he was participating in a protest in the main Avenue in San Antonio. Suddenly the military police started coming forward. Jose went up the street, where he lived as seen in the top picture. Note that it is a street with little houses, purely residential. Jose looked back, kept running and soon after that picture was taken, he was shot by the military police that you see in the backgroung. The next picture shows him dying. Note he even has his backpack on in both pictures. He died soon afterwards. He was 42 and a friend of some of my friends at the Venezuelan Institute of Scientific Research.

(I apologize if these pictures offend anyone. I thought they  were a little strong and considered not showing them. But this blog was started as a document of the impunity and the injustice going on in Venezuela and the pictureshave to be part of it.)

Somebody sent me this picture of the National Guard in the morning before the march arrived. It simply had a caption: GUARDIA NAZI ONAL

Obviously overkill for a peaceful march…