Dave Barry and electronic voting

September 12, 2004

Don’t forget to read Dave Barry´s article today on electronic voting. At least it may give you a laugh about our problems.


Seminar at Simon Bolivar University: Two presentations

September 12, 2004

Besides the overview presentation by Isabel Llatas, there were two talks at this first seminar:


1)      Statistical study of the CNE data by Bernardo Marquez et al.


 


This is a group of engineers which looked at the statistical properties of the electronic results at the two lowest levels of detail, at the Center level and at the parish level.


 


Basically, the CNE divided the nation into 321 municipalities. Each municipality was divided itself into parishes and the parishes into centers. There were on average 2.6 parishes per municipality and on average there were 5.4 centers per parish. There were on average 10,098 votes per center and 26,486 votes per parish.


 


The study was a statistical hypothesis testing of all of the CNE data. The basic hypothesis was that the CNE data is valid and thus by looking at averages an standard deviations one should be able to establish confidence levels at both the parish and the center level, in terms of votes within a parish or center being in the correct range. By this, it means that they look at the final result of a machine and check whether that result is within what is expected from the statistics of the center or the parish.


 


The authors found that with a 95% confidence level, there are only 7% of the machines at the center level which show unexpected results with respect to the center. In contrast, they found that 62% of the parishes showed unexpected results. If the confidence level was 99% they found 51% of the machines had unexpected results.


 


They then looked at each parish to see how much centers differed within a parish by looking at the standard deviations of each center. Then, they eliminated what they called the non-homogenous centers, those in which the centers within a parish showed significant differences in the standard deviations of the distributions. Thus, they kept only the “homogeneous” parishes and found that with a 95% level of confidence 42% of the machines showed unexpected results and with 99% confidence 26% of the machines showed unexpected results.


 


2)      A study of the coincidences in the votes in the machine by Raul Jimenez (USB), Alfredo Marcano (USB) and Juan Jimenez (UCV)


 


This talk discussed the various simulations that have been done to study the coincidences. It was very critical of Rubin’s and Taylor’s form the technical point of view. I must say that what I was not able to understand the details of what they did, it was beyond my understanding and I tried. Basically, they are using fairly sophisticated mathematical theory to look at the problem and study probabilities of occurrences.


 


In their most detailed work, they looked at the probability of SI and No coincidences as well as the probability that the sum of the Si and No votes also coincides. They obtained a probability of 3.5 in 10,000 for the SI coincidences, reasonable (I think it was 0.3) for the NO and 1 in 1,000,000 for the sum of SI and No to coincide. 


 


This result is being submitted as a scientific paper to a journal next week and the author said he will send me a copy when he send it in to the Journal.


Seminar at Simon Bolivar University: Two presentations

September 12, 2004

Besides the overview presentation by Isabel Llatas, there were two talks at this first seminar:


1)      Statistical study of the CNE data by Bernardo Marquez et al.


 


This is a group of engineers which looked at the statistical properties of the electronic results at the two lowest levels of detail, at the Center level and at the parish level.


 


Basically, the CNE divided the nation into 321 municipalities. Each municipality was divided itself into parishes and the parishes into centers. There were on average 2.6 parishes per municipality and on average there were 5.4 centers per parish. There were on average 10,098 votes per center and 26,486 votes per parish.


 


The study was a statistical hypothesis testing of all of the CNE data. The basic hypothesis was that the CNE data is valid and thus by looking at averages an standard deviations one should be able to establish confidence levels at both the parish and the center level, in terms of votes within a parish or center being in the correct range. By this, it means that they look at the final result of a machine and check whether that result is within what is expected from the statistics of the center or the parish.


 


The authors found that with a 95% confidence level, there are only 7% of the machines at the center level which show unexpected results with respect to the center. In contrast, they found that 62% of the parishes showed unexpected results. If the confidence level was 99% they found 51% of the machines had unexpected results.


 


They then looked at each parish to see how much centers differed within a parish by looking at the standard deviations of each center. Then, they eliminated what they called the non-homogenous centers, those in which the centers within a parish showed significant differences in the standard deviations of the distributions. Thus, they kept only the “homogeneous” parishes and found that with a 95% level of confidence 42% of the machines showed unexpected results and with 99% confidence 26% of the machines showed unexpected results.


 


2)      A study of the coincidences in the votes in the machine by Raul Jimenez (USB), Alfredo Marcano (USB) and Juan Jimenez (UCV)


 


This talk discussed the various simulations that have been done to study the coincidences. It was very critical of Rubin’s and Taylor’s form the technical point of view. I must say that what I was not able to understand the details of what they did, it was beyond my understanding and I tried. Basically, they are using fairly sophisticated mathematical theory to look at the problem and study probabilities of occurrences.


 


In their most detailed work, they looked at the probability of SI and No coincidences as well as the probability that the sum of the Si and No votes also coincides. They obtained a probability of 3.5 in 10,000 for the SI coincidences, reasonable (I think it was 0.3) for the NO and 1 in 1,000,000 for the sum of SI and No to coincide. 


 


This result is being submitted as a scientific paper to a journal next week and the author said he will send me a copy when he send it in to the Journal.


The land the Government works on by Carlos Machado Allison

September 12, 2004

Carlos Machado Allison is a retired Professor from Universidad Central de Venezuela who now Works at IESA. Carlos’s specialty is land use. Personally, I have never heard anyone in Venezuela talk about land use with Carlos’ knowledge, so I thought I would translate parts of his article this week in El Universal on the issue:


 


The land the Government works on by Carlos Machado Allison


 


Agricultural producers know agrarian demagoguery, with its vote capture potential and international sympathy at the expense of destroying trust. Its goal is not to improve production, productivity or the capability to feed the population, after all, powerful and with a good flow of US dollars, the state can continue importing and selling at a loss as long as it creates sympathies among the poor. It is a matter of perpetuating itself in power, Maduro dixit, increasing the size of the bureaucracy and imposing a state capitalism using the style of Mexico in the pre- war


 


In the revolutionary Mexico, General “Tata” Cardenas created the pro-Government Confederacion Campesina (Peasant Federation) (CNC), converted the Mexican Confederation of Workers in to an arm of the Government (1937) and threatened the industrials sector with handing the factories over to the workers, it distributed 19 million Hectares, without forgetting a piece for the revolutionary politicians and generals, created the mega bureaucracy of Pemex, managing to have it lose money for more than 40 years and also reduced agricultural production   by 7%.


 


But the Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana with its sector, workers, peasants, military and popular, rebaptized in 1946 as PRI, remained in power until five years ago. The peasants, like here, lacked title to their property and depended, financially, commercially and technically on the bureaucratic apparatchik. Velasco in Peru and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua did even worse, killing agricultural production, increasing agricultural imports and creating programs and state companies to administer foodstuffs. Poverty and unemployment grew, but the revolutionaries in the unions, bureaucratic positions and mayors and Governors got wealthy: a new oligarchy arose. Much like it is happening here.


 


If the purpose were to give away land, with all of the demagoguery, bureaucratic expense and inefficiency that it implies, there are between 15 and 20 million unproductive hectares in the hands of the state. The truth is that they don’t even know how much they have. Then, why an instantaneous militia census of private land with no technical basis? Why threaten everyone, if the little blue book (the Constitution) clearly says that the Government can expropriate for the public good with a sentence from a Court and payment of fair value. Could it be to threaten the Government’s adversaries while obtaining applauses from the “poor” beneficiaries? There will be some success, some will abandon the business, others will hold on hoping for better times and there will be others who will try to sell, if this Government, full of foreign currency decides to purchase the land, even if it does not know what for.


 


In another early surprise, the President will say that the militia has discovered thousands of unproductive hectares, that people are fattening the land and not the cattle. He will not say that there is unproductive land because consumption has been eroded, because there is unemployment and no personal or judicial security. He will not say either that there is not trustable census of land use and that in six years; agricultural productivity has been the worse in the continent. He will say that the land belongs to those that work it, that is, as long as it does not belong to that large real estate company, the state, which he presides.


The land the Government works on by Carlos Machado Allison

September 12, 2004

Carlos Machado Allison is a retired Professor from Universidad Central de Venezuela who now Works at IESA. Carlos’s specialty is land use. Personally, I have never heard anyone in Venezuela talk about land use with Carlos’ knowledge, so I thought I would translate parts of his article this week in El Universal on the issue:


 


The land the Government works on by Carlos Machado Allison


 


Agricultural producers know agrarian demagoguery, with its vote capture potential and international sympathy at the expense of destroying trust. Its goal is not to improve production, productivity or the capability to feed the population, after all, powerful and with a good flow of US dollars, the state can continue importing and selling at a loss as long as it creates sympathies among the poor. It is a matter of perpetuating itself in power, Maduro dixit, increasing the size of the bureaucracy and imposing a state capitalism using the style of Mexico in the pre- war


 


In the revolutionary Mexico, General “Tata” Cardenas created the pro-Government Confederacion Campesina (Peasant Federation) (CNC), converted the Mexican Confederation of Workers in to an arm of the Government (1937) and threatened the industrials sector with handing the factories over to the workers, it distributed 19 million Hectares, without forgetting a piece for the revolutionary politicians and generals, created the mega bureaucracy of Pemex, managing to have it lose money for more than 40 years and also reduced agricultural production   by 7%.


 


But the Partido de la Revolucion Mexicana with its sector, workers, peasants, military and popular, rebaptized in 1946 as PRI, remained in power until five years ago. The peasants, like here, lacked title to their property and depended, financially, commercially and technically on the bureaucratic apparatchik. Velasco in Peru and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua did even worse, killing agricultural production, increasing agricultural imports and creating programs and state companies to administer foodstuffs. Poverty and unemployment grew, but the revolutionaries in the unions, bureaucratic positions and mayors and Governors got wealthy: a new oligarchy arose. Much like it is happening here.


 


If the purpose were to give away land, with all of the demagoguery, bureaucratic expense and inefficiency that it implies, there are between 15 and 20 million unproductive hectares in the hands of the state. The truth is that they don’t even know how much they have. Then, why an instantaneous militia census of private land with no technical basis? Why threaten everyone, if the little blue book (the Constitution) clearly says that the Government can expropriate for the public good with a sentence from a Court and payment of fair value. Could it be to threaten the Government’s adversaries while obtaining applauses from the “poor” beneficiaries? There will be some success, some will abandon the business, others will hold on hoping for better times and there will be others who will try to sell, if this Government, full of foreign currency decides to purchase the land, even if it does not know what for.


 


In another early surprise, the President will say that the militia has discovered thousands of unproductive hectares, that people are fattening the land and not the cattle. He will not say that there is unproductive land because consumption has been eroded, because there is unemployment and no personal or judicial security. He will not say either that there is not trustable census of land use and that in six years; agricultural productivity has been the worse in the continent. He will say that the land belongs to those that work it, that is, as long as it does not belong to that large real estate company, the state, which he presides.


Seminar at Simon Bolivar University on the mathematics of the recall results: An Overview

September 9, 2004

There was a seminar today at Simon Bolivar University (USB), the leading technical university in Venezuela, on mathematical studies of the recall vote. The event, which was also sponsored by Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV) was quite interesting. I was planning to write a full report, but unfortunately (for you) maybe fortunately (for me) I forgot my notes at my office and if I want to speak with precision, I need them.


Perhaps the most interesting part is the effect this is having on the academic community. You have a bunch of mathematicians and physicists applying the tools of their academic and research trade to a real life problem. Additionally, many people are working on the same problem so there is a lively and daily exchange of ideas. This is good for Venezuelan science, independent of the final results.


 


The problem is being look at from a variety of different angles that go from very pedestrian statistical analysis to sublime techniques and I am sure, soon some may get into using divine ones that I will never be able to understand. Speakers were very careful in not using the word ¨fraud¨, concentrating on ¨probability¨,¨ likelihood¨ and other such terms.


 


The first talk was given by Isabel Llatas and it was an overview of the work that is being done or has been done so far. I counted 24 different names of scientists here or abroad looking at the problem from different angles.


 


Llatas showed partial results from the work of Sanso and Prado, which I have posted here, from that of Isbelia Martin, which I posted two nights ago as well as from that of Luis Raul Pericchi who has been using Benford´s Law to study the results of the referendum vote. Pericchi will speak in the second one of these seminars next Thursday, but I found the work very interesting and will mention it later in this post.


 


Llatas showed how people have looked at the available CNE data in many different forms, separating it into data which was counted electronically and manually, as well as geographical distributions. What came across from the talk is that there is a lot of work that has already been done in the last three weeks with the available data and scientists are still working on things, making sure they are right, before publishing it or talking about it.


 


After this, came two talks which I will dwell on in detail later. The first one was by a group of engineers that have looked at the statistical properties of the votes at the center and parish level, finding what they call “irregular” results at a significant number of machines. The second talk was by Raul Jimenez  et al. who have been looking at the problem of coincidences and has some interesting formal and practical results, which suggest the coincidences are quite unlikely. One of his most surprising statements was that there are also coincidences in the total number of votes per machine SI’s+NO’s and he has found that these coincidences have the lowest probability of occurring, with a number like a probability being one in a million.


 


Before today I had heard of Pericchi’s work, but had no idea what that was about until I saw a graph of his results and decided to look into the background. (I have no more details than what I will give at the end of this post). His work is based on Benford’s Law, a concept that now that I know about it, I have to wonder how I could have lived all these years without it!  


 


Benford’s Law


 


Imagine you have a table of populations of towns and cities for a given country. These numbers are distributed according to a probability distribution with a mean and a standard deviation. But suppose that rather than look at the full number you looked at the first digit of each number, 1 thru 9, from left to right. Intuitively most people would think that the probability of that number being, 1, 2, 3…..or 9 would be exactly the same. Well, it isn’t. If you look at wide range of statistical tables, such as the prices of stocks in the NYSE, baseball statistics or even numbers in the financial statements of a company, you find that the probability of that first digit being a 1 is 0.301, 2 is 0.176, 3 is 0.124…all the way down to 9 the probability of which is 0.04576.


 


The following is a table taken from here with the probabilities found from taking first digit statistics of the first digit in numbers found in the front page of a newspaper, the 1990 census on county populations and the prices of the stocks in the Dow Jones Industrials from 1990-1993.


 



 


The reason for this is that the populations are evenly distributed on a logarithmic scale and many of these processes are logarithmic. Think of stock prices. If you issue stock at $10 and your company grows 100% every five years, the digit 1 would be the first one of your stock price the first five years, but after that, the digit two will only be part of it less than two and a half years and the length of time will get shorter as the stock price grows. So, if you have hundreds of stocks, you will always observe more first digits with a one than any other number.


 


This turns out to have important consequences in real life testing. Supposedly (haven’t found the reference) the first time someone saw something fishy in Enron’s numbers was because some particular table of number did not fit Benford’s Law.


 


The IRS uses Benford’s law to detect fraud, auditors to detect fraud in companies and companies to detect fraud by employees. The reason is simple, if someone tampers with the data, they will likely spread the numbers uniformly and the probability of a 1 as a first single digit would be as likely as any other number. The same thing happens if people commit fraud; they spread the amounts around evenly thinking that it will not be noticed. Auditing forms apparently have many tests like this for companies’ data such as customer refund tables and account receivables.


 


You can extend the calculation for the single digit to the first two digits and you can calculate those in that case too. 


 


What I understood today is that what Pericchi et al. have done is to apply Benford’s law to the election results, looking at the total votes at each “cuaderno” level. Reportedly, and I will report the details on it when I hear their talk next Thursday, they have found that the machine results do not fit Benford’s law at all, while the manual ones fit it quite well.


Seminar at Simon Bolivar University on the mathematics of the recall results: An Overview

September 9, 2004

There was a seminar today at Simon Bolivar University (USB), the leading technical university in Venezuela, on mathematical studies of the recall vote. The event, which was also sponsored by Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV) was quite interesting. I was planning to write a full report, but unfortunately (for you) maybe fortunately (for me) I forgot my notes at my office and if I want to speak with precision, I need them.


Perhaps the most interesting part is the effect this is having on the academic community. You have a bunch of mathematicians and physicists applying the tools of their academic and research trade to a real life problem. Additionally, many people are working on the same problem so there is a lively and daily exchange of ideas. This is good for Venezuelan science, independent of the final results.


 


The problem is being look at from a variety of different angles that go from very pedestrian statistical analysis to sublime techniques and I am sure, soon some may get into using divine ones that I will never be able to understand. Speakers were very careful in not using the word ¨fraud¨, concentrating on ¨probability¨,¨ likelihood¨ and other such terms.


 


The first talk was given by Isabel Llatas and it was an overview of the work that is being done or has been done so far. I counted 24 different names of scientists here or abroad looking at the problem from different angles.


 


Llatas showed partial results from the work of Sanso and Prado, which I have posted here, from that of Isbelia Martin, which I posted two nights ago as well as from that of Luis Raul Pericchi who has been using Benford´s Law to study the results of the referendum vote. Pericchi will speak in the second one of these seminars next Thursday, but I found the work very interesting and will mention it later in this post.


 


Llatas showed how people have looked at the available CNE data in many different forms, separating it into data which was counted electronically and manually, as well as geographical distributions. What came across from the talk is that there is a lot of work that has already been done in the last three weeks with the available data and scientists are still working on things, making sure they are right, before publishing it or talking about it.


 


After this, came two talks which I will dwell on in detail later. The first one was by a group of engineers that have looked at the statistical properties of the votes at the center and parish level, finding what they call “irregular” results at a significant number of machines. The second talk was by Raul Jimenez  et al. who have been looking at the problem of coincidences and has some interesting formal and practical results, which suggest the coincidences are quite unlikely. One of his most surprising statements was that there are also coincidences in the total number of votes per machine SI’s+NO’s and he has found that these coincidences have the lowest probability of occurring, with a number like a probability being one in a million.


 


Before today I had heard of Pericchi’s work, but had no idea what that was about until I saw a graph of his results and decided to look into the background. (I have no more details than what I will give at the end of this post). His work is based on Benford’s Law, a concept that now that I know about it, I have to wonder how I could have lived all these years without it!  


 


Benford’s Law


 


Imagine you have a table of populations of towns and cities for a given country. These numbers are distributed according to a probability distribution with a mean and a standard deviation. But suppose that rather than look at the full number you looked at the first digit of each number, 1 thru 9, from left to right. Intuitively most people would think that the probability of that number being, 1, 2, 3…..or 9 would be exactly the same. Well, it isn’t. If you look at wide range of statistical tables, such as the prices of stocks in the NYSE, baseball statistics or even numbers in the financial statements of a company, you find that the probability of that first digit being a 1 is 0.301, 2 is 0.176, 3 is 0.124…all the way down to 9 the probability of which is 0.04576.


 


The following is a table taken from here with the probabilities found from taking first digit statistics of the first digit in numbers found in the front page of a newspaper, the 1990 census on county populations and the prices of the stocks in the Dow Jones Industrials from 1990-1993.


 



 


The reason for this is that the populations are evenly distributed on a logarithmic scale and many of these processes are logarithmic. Think of stock prices. If you issue stock at $10 and your company grows 100% every five years, the digit 1 would be the first one of your stock price the first five years, but after that, the digit two will only be part of it less than two and a half years and the length of time will get shorter as the stock price grows. So, if you have hundreds of stocks, you will always observe more first digits with a one than any other number.


 


This turns out to have important consequences in real life testing. Supposedly (haven’t found the reference) the first time someone saw something fishy in Enron’s numbers was because some particular table of number did not fit Benford’s Law.


 


The IRS uses Benford’s law to detect fraud, auditors to detect fraud in companies and companies to detect fraud by employees. The reason is simple, if someone tampers with the data, they will likely spread the numbers uniformly and the probability of a 1 as a first single digit would be as likely as any other number. The same thing happens if people commit fraud; they spread the amounts around evenly thinking that it will not be noticed. Auditing forms apparently have many tests like this for companies’ data such as customer refund tables and account receivables.


 


You can extend the calculation for the single digit to the first two digits and you can calculate those in that case too. 


 


What I understood today is that what Pericchi et al. have done is to apply Benford’s law to the election results, looking at the total votes at each “cuaderno” level. Reportedly, and I will report the details on it when I hear their talk next Thursday, they have found that the machine results do not fit Benford’s law at all, while the manual ones fit it quite well.


Conned in Caracas from the WSJ

September 9, 2004

An opinion piece on the fraud in the Wall Street Journal:


CONNED IN CARACAS


 

New evidence that Jimmy Carter got fooled in Venezuela.

Thursday, September 9, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT

Both the Bush Administration and former President Jimmy Carter were quick to bless the results of last month’s Venezuelan recall vote, but it now looks like they were had. A statistical analysis by a pair of economists suggests that the random-sample “audit” results that the Americans trusted weren’t random at all.

This is no small matter. The imprimatur of Mr. Carter and his Carter Center election observers is being used by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to claim a mandate. The anti-American strongman has been steering his country toward dictatorship and is stirring up trouble throughout Latin America. If the recall election wasn’t fair, why would Americans want to endorse it?

The new study was released this week by economists Ricardo Hausmann of Harvard and Roberto Rigobon of MIT. They zeroed in on a key problem with the August 18 vote audit that was run by the government’s electoral council (CNE): In choosing which polling stations would be audited, the CNE refused to use the random number generator recommended by the Carter Center. Instead, the CNE insisted on its own program, run on its own computer. Mr. Carter’s team acquiesced, and Messrs. Hausmann and Rigobon conclude that, in controlling this software, the government had the means to cheat.

“This result opens the possibility that the fraud was committed only in a subset of the 4,580 automated centers, say 3,000, and that the audit was successful because it directed the search to the 1,580 unaltered centers. That is why it was so important not to use the Carter Center number generator. If this was the case, Carter could never have figured it out.”


<!– D(["mb","Mr. Hausmann told us that he and Mr. Rigoban also "found very clear trails of fraud in the statistical record" and a probability of less than 1% that the anomalies observed could be pure chance. To put it another way, they think the chance is 99% that there was electoral fraud. \

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The authors also suggest that the fraud was centralized. Voting machines were supposed to print tallies before communicating by Internet with the CNE center. But the CNE changed that rule, arranging to have totals sent to the center first and only later printing tally sheets. This increases the potential for fraud because the Smartmatic voting machines suddenly had two-way communication capacity that they weren\’t supposed to have. The economists say this means the CNE center could have sent messages back to polling stations to alter the totals. \

None of this would matter if the auditing process had been open to scrutiny by the Carter observers. But as the economists point out: "After an arduous negotiation, the Electoral Council allowed the OAS [Organization of American States] and the Carter Center to observe all aspects of the election process except for the central computer hub, a place where they also prohibited the presence of any witnesses from the opposition. At the time, this appeared to be an insignificant detail. Now it looks much more meaningful." \

Yes, it does. It would seem that Colin Powell and the Carter Center have some explaining to do. The last thing either would want is for Latins to think that the U.S is now apologizing for governments that steal elections. Back when he was President, Mr. Carter once famously noted that the Afghanistan invasion had finally caused him to see the truth about Leonid Brezhnev. A similar revelation would seem to be in order toward Mr. Chavez. \

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Mr. Hausmann told us that he and Mr. Rigoban also “found very clear trails of fraud in the statistical record” and a probability of less than 1% that the anomalies observed could be pure chance. To put it another way, they think the chance is 99% that there was electoral fraud.



The authors also suggest that the fraud was centralized. Voting machines were supposed to print tallies before communicating by Internet with the CNE center. But the CNE changed that rule, arranging to have totals sent to the center first and only later printing tally sheets. This increases the potential for fraud because the Smartmatic voting machines suddenly had two-way communication capacity that they weren’t supposed to have. The economists say this means the CNE center could have sent messages back to polling stations to alter the totals.

None of this would matter if the auditing process had been open to scrutiny by the Carter observers. But as the economists point out: “After an arduous negotiation, the Electoral Council allowed the OAS [Organization of American States] and the Carter Center to observe all aspects of the election process except for the central computer hub, a place where they also prohibited the presence of any witnesses from the opposition. At the time, this appeared to be an insignificant detail. Now it looks much more meaningful.”

Yes, it does. It would seem that Colin Powell and the Carter Center have some explaining to do. The last thing either would want is for Latins to think that the U.S is now apologizing for governments that steal elections. Back when he was President, Mr. Carter once famously noted that the Afghanistan invasion had finally caused him to see the truth about Leonid Brezhnev. A similar revelation would seem to be in order toward Mr. Chavez.


Opposition presents its preliminay report on fraud

September 9, 2004

The Coordinadora Democratica presented its preliminary report today on the case for fraud. The report is basically divided into three broad parts:


1)      How the Chavez Government controlled institutions and used them to its advantage from 1998 on, including controlling the Electoral powers and the manipulation of processes in the judicial system.


 


2)      The drive to provide foreigners with ID’s as a contribution to fraud in the electoral process


 


3)      Mathematical studies and evidence obtained from the transmission of data that was in violation of the regulations and suggests some form of manipulation may have taken place.


 


4)      Control of the process and the role of observers.


 


Part 1) of the document may be of interest to someone that became aware of the Venezuelan political crisis only recently. But in some respects it is what this blog has been covering for the last two years. Thus, I will highlight only what the report says in the other three broad sections.


 


-The drive to add voters


 


The report describes how the Government began on April 9 2004 a drive to provide ID cards to people over 18. The Government created special offices run by MVR party members and not by the ONIDEX which is in charge of this. They used a system without any type of security and people were given the ID cards without verification of data. The process had no controls and all the people who were giving ID’s were automatically registered to vote.


 


This process led to 1.8 million people being given ID’s in only four months, without controls, supervision and in indiscriminate fashion and without any of the Government offices in charge of these processes being involved in it. A large part of these new registered voters were in rural regions, with voters registered in centers where voting was manual.


 


In twenty of the twenty four states the electoral registry had a percentage higher than the historical value of 48% of the population, with only four states having less than 50% and the electoral registry increasing from 48% to 54% of the population in six months.


 


By now, some may be thinking or saying this is just democracy at work and what the Chavez Government did was simply to add people to the electoral rolls. However, there is now a general phenomenon that in towns, cities and municipalities there are now more voters than inhabitants. This strange behavior is concentrated in locations where the vote was manual instead of electronic.


 


Mathematics and Communications


 


The report cites work done at the level of parishes in which statistical analysis shows anomalies in the final results at the local level. According to this study, that I have not seen in this detail, with 99% confidence it was demonstrated that 26% of the voting machines had statistical values outside of what would be expected from the point of view of the distribution at the parish level. The report also includes the Hausmann, Rigobon study as part of its evidence.


 


What I found most interesting were the parts relating to communications. Most of this I knew little pieces of, but I had not seen such an overview of it:


 


Bidirectionality. CANTV records demonstrate that there was two-way communications between the voting machines and the CNE servers. Recall that the President of Smartmatic stated after the recall vote that such communication was impossible.


 


Types of communications: The report argues that given the nature of the process the type of communications between each voting center and the CNE should be very similar. However, the study revealed three types of endings to the communications: i) Those terminated by the voting machines i)) Those terminated by the server and iii) Those that appeared to arise from a loss of carrier. All three types occur with similar frequency which has no explanation.


 


Traffic Patterns: If all of the machines were transmitting just the results, the volumes of data transmitted by each machine should be similar. This is not the case; there are wide differences in the traffic patterns from different machines and voting centers. This has no plausible explanation.


 


Transmissions out of schedule: There were connections all day beginning at 7AM, the agreement was that there would only be communications after the machines had printed their results. The regulations state that this should be the case.


 


-Control of the process and observers


 


The report is highly critical of the Carter Center, it says these results in part from the superficiality of the Center which acted as if this was a normal voting process and not that of a country with the conflicts it has had in the last few years.


 


The report criticizes the fact that the Carter Center at no time criticized, like the OAS did, the fact that the Government had maintained control over the whole Electoral process with its majority at the Electoral Board.


 


The report repeats what we already know of the hot audit that was supposed to include 199 machines selected at random by a program designed by the CNE. Of these only 27 were audited in the presence of the opposition and in those 27 the SI won 63% to 37%.


 


The report also relates how it was impossible for anyone to enter the totalization room at the CNE. Not even the OAS and the Carter Center were allowed in even though it had been agreed that they could.


 


The report questions why when the opposition was trying to find acceptable terms to the cold audit performed after the RR, they were told that the observers had already “selected” on a procedure with the CNE which would be a random selection of boxes. In a last minute attempt to convince the opposition to accept the results of the audit,  the Carter Center assured the opposition that the program to select the boxes would be under the control of the Carter Center.


 


And it is here that the report is most critical of the Carter Center, calling it inefficient, superficial and even irresponsible. The report says that the Carter Center program was an Excel program which was not used due to “technical reasons” (!!!!)Thus, the same program questioned on Sunday by the opposition and made by the CNE was used. The report is also critical of something that I pointed out here, in that the Carter Center makes a lot of emphasis on the fact that its representative were next to the ballot boxes all the time, but fail to point out that over 60 hours went by between August 15th. and August 18th. when the audit was performed, when the boxes were alone.


 


The report also says that the boxes from Lara state and Bolivar sate took a large number of hours to arrive and despite the fact that there were assurances that all boxes from Caracas were at the Tuna fort in the Southwest of the city, this turned out not be the case. .


 


Conclusions:


 


The report concludes by suggesting that the process be legally challenged, that the Electoral registry be legally challenged, that the Smartmatic system be questioned and that the next election be done with manual counting for the whole country.


 


In an interesting conclusion, the report suggests that the Coordinadora ask the US Government for the application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act against Smartmatic and Verizon, the controlling shareholder of CANTV.  This is an interesting twist as it will require that the evidence be presented and the case be tried in US Courts, far from the control of the Chavez Government.


On Mathematical models of the recall vote and fraud, part VIII: The physicists’ chopped up binomial distribution

September 7, 2004


 


This is a rewrite of last night’s post, Quico wanted it to be clear to 12 year olds, that might be stretching it, but hope it works for 21 year olds:


 


Isbelia Martin and a group of physicists at Simón Bolívar University have been looking at the statistics of the number of votes for each voting machine and by states.


 


The behaviour of the votes in an electoral process should follow what is called a binomial distribution.  A binomial distribution occurs whenever you have two outcomes of a process; the classical example is when you flip a coin. If the coin is fair, half of the time you get heads, half of the time you get tails. You get a distribution when you do an experiment many times, that is, suppose you flip a coin 1oo times and record how many heads or tails you get, but your repeat the experiment 100 times. You then record how many times you got only one head (very unlikely), two, three and so on. At the end you divide the frequency of getting each one of these cases and you get a probability distribution like this one that I stole from this site:


 



 


 


The voting process is similar in that the voters are in theory fairly independent in their decision. In the case of the voting process, the flipping of the coins becomes each voting center, which may have either a total number of voters or a total number of registered voters. So, you could construct a probability distribution, much like the one above, in which you could plot, as a first simple case, the number of people that actually voted. This is a binomial, because the voter decides between two choices whether to go and vote or not. Each voter is assumed to be independent of the other, even though there may be family pressures to go and vote. The main difference between this problem and the coin problem is that the probabilities are not 0.5 for each case. In fact, in the recall vote abstention was approximately 32%, so you could say that the probability of any given person voting was p=0.68 and the person not voting had a probability of 0.32.


 


What is different in this problem is that you have machines of different size, so what you can count is how many people voted n in each machine of size N, and then plot the frequency of occurrences for each machine of size N. What you get in the case of the voters in the recall referendum is something very similar to the distribution of the coin toss problem, which is expected, since both are binomial processes.


 


Mathematically, you can calculate the probability for a binomial process that you will get a value of n voters showing up to vote for each machine with N registered voters. Thus, if we have machines with N voters each, the probability that a voter will go vote is p and the probability that it will not go and vote is q=p-1, thus if we have M machines with N voters, the number of voters n that do go and vote, will be between “0 and N and will follow what is called a binomial distribution given by


 


P(n)=(N!/n!(N-n)!) p^n x q^(N-n)


 


This is a bell shaped curve like the one plotted above


 


Supposed we now plot instead the number of voters that did go and vote (abstention) as a function of the number of voters per machine that were registered at each machine, if the distribution is binomial the points for the abstention should form a cloud of points that open up like the tail of a comet with the greatest density along an imaginary line with a slope proportional to the average attendance of voters in that population. If half the people abstained, this cloud would be along the 22.5 degree line with respect to the horizontal, but since in the case of the recall the percentage of abstention was 32%, this cloud would be below the 22.5 degree line.


 


Below is a plot of such graph for the number of people n that did not go and vote in all of the centers in Miranda state as a function of the number of voters registered per machine N:


 



 


 


 


Plot of the number of voters that that abstained as a function of the number of registered voters N at each machine for Miranda state.


 


This is a textbook type of example of what one should get for a process that should follow a binomial distribution. Thus, the first conclusion is that the data from the recall vote in terms of the choice between going to vote or not behaves in Miranda state and nationally, much like what is expected from a binomial distribution.


 


The same logic should apply to the SI and NO votes. It should be a binomial distribution since it represents a choice between two possibilities. If the vote split were a perfect 50%/50% for the Si and the No, and one plotted the number of votes n for one or the other possibility as a function of the number of actual voters at each machine N, the cloud would spread below the 45 degree line that divides the plane, along a 22.5 degree imaginary line. In the recall vote, since the No won then, if one plots the dispersion plot for the NO votes on would get a cloud above the 22.5 degree line and a similar one below that line for the corresponding cloud of SI votes which is also plotted below.


 


However, what is observed is completely different as seen in the next graph for the number of NO votes n, in Miranda state as an example, as a function of the number of voters in each machine N:


 



 


 


 


Plot of the number of  No voters as a function of the number of voters N at each machine


 


 


Instead of obtaining a single cloud, one obtains two separate areas of high density with a valley of low density separating them. I have drawn three imaginary lines to guide the idea to the valley (area with low density between the two thicker clouds) as well as imaginary lines along the two separate clouds at each side.


 


Exactly the same type of behaviour is seen for the number of SI votes n in Miranda state as a function of the number of voters in each voting center N:


 



 


 


 


Plot of the number of Si voters as a function of the number of voters N at each machine


 


 


This shows the same low density valley, where I have drawn a line to guide the eye and two clouds at each side.


 


Thus, Miranda data, which conforms to a binomial distribution when one looks at the binomial process of abstention versus voting, does not conform to a binomial distribution. In fact, according to the authors, the data for Miranda state would NEVER conform to a binomial distribution. This is the second conclusion: The data for the Si and No votes does not conform to a binomial but is part of the same data that did conform to a binomial in the case of the abstention. In fact it would never conform to it.


 


Even more interesting, the same type of behaviour has been seen in Zulia, Carabobo, Anzoategui, Tachira and  Lara, but “textbook” type of behaviour is found in other states such as Falcon and Vargas. Other smaller states also show classical behaviour. This creates a big problem, how would one explain that some states behave exactly like a binomial, textbooks cases, no discrepancies, while certain selected states do not?


 


In order to try to understand this unusual behaviour, the authors plotted the histogram of occurrences for the Si and NO votes as shown in the next figure:


 



 


Histogram of the occurrences of the Si (red), No (blue) votes as a function of the number of votes.


 


There are two distributions plotted in this figure: The Si bars are the distribution of occurrences of the number of Si voters for each machine with N voters, in the blue the distribution for the number of NO voters as a function of the number of N voters in the machine. As you can see it is as if the Si votes had had a piece chopped up for machines in which the number of registered voters was above 250 and up to 350. This data is for Miranda state, but if one looks at a similar histogram at the national level, the same type of “chopped up” binomial distribution is observed. This is the third conclusion: The distribution is a binomial that appears to have part of it “chopped up” as if part of the Si votes were shifted to No votes.


 


It is this same chopping up which accounts for the valleys in the two unusual dispersion curves.


 


Thus, it would seem as if the process is not at all like a binomial as it should be, but follows instead a distribution which appears to have some form of artificiality and selectively introduced into it, creating two types of distribution. Curiously, the abstention had the proper behaviour expected from a binomial, but is part of a process within the same data. This result is consistent with the hypothesis of Haussman and Rigobon that only a certain number of machines may have been manipulated, in this case, the data suggests if was a selection based on the number of registered voters per machine, which determined whether the data was manipulated or not.