Archive for the 'Venezuela' Category

Who the true traitors in Venezuela really are

February 17, 2008

Over the last week there has been a cry for Venezuelans to outright reject ExxonMobil’s threats against the country and a call for Venezuelans to all rally around this issue over this “common” enemy. If you don’t, say those that are making this call, who are both in the Government and in the opposition, you are simply a traitor to your country.

Sorry, I just don’t buy, you can not make me rally behind the irresponsible behavior of the Venezuelan Government, any more than you will not find me in favor of war against Colombia over any incident caused by Hugo Chavez. This is simply false patriotism at its best. I know exactly who the traitors are and let me tell you it is not those who objectively analyze the situation and realize that it is a clash between a commercial entity (ExxonMobil) and Venezuela’s oil company who sought to take advantage of its position to force ExxonMobil to give up its property and the rights it had acquired via a contract.

ExxonMobil is no saint, they went into this project in good faith in partnership with the Venezuelan oil company and the reason they have bean able to obtain injunctions against PDVSA’s assets, is precisely because PDVSA and the Venezuelan Government decided to bypass valid contracts over and over until ExxonMobil decided it had enough and started fighting it. In a very real sense, this is no different than the expropriation of farms, companies such as Invepal taken over by the Chavez Government without any compensation and even the buyout of telecom company CANTV where the Chavez Government forced everyone to sell to it at a value below fair value. Everyone lost, because the Government had the upper hand, even the Venezuelans who invested in CANTV in good faith in the IPO.

A country will not function well until a contract signed between two parties is as solid as the paper it is signed on, respected not only by all that sign it, but also by the Courts. A society can not work if there is no rule of law. I expect contracts to be respected not only by my country, but also by the company I work for, or by my relatives. If they don’t respect them, I want nothing to do with them. It’s called principles, not treason, as many want to make it out to be.

Just to make sure, let’s review a little bit of the history of the Cerro Negro project, how it came about to be and how and why it was set up as it was and has led to the events of the recent weeks. If anyone finds a detail that is not correct, please let me know, I am relying on my own memory for the details:

In the 1990’s, the Orinoco Oil belt was long on promise but short on results. The price of oil was oscillating in the low to mid teens and it was difficult to make a profit improving oil from the Orinoco Oil belt unless one took the best of the best of the oil from the area, which was not the idea. (Oil from the area can vary widely from fairly light to almost shale)

PDVSA decided to partner with those that had the technology for improving heavy oils, which happened to be mostly the major oil companies of the world. It was then still a risky proposition, as the projects would only be profitable at the time at US$ 12 per barrel. There were basically two countries involved in this field: Canada and Venezuela. Canada, particularly the province of Alberta, offered very attractive conditions, still valid today, in which companies pay a royalty of 1% until the revenues of the project reach the initial investment at which time it would jump to 16.5%. Additionally, these companies pay income tax of 25% in Alberta.

To make the projects attractive, PDVSA then matched the 1% condition of Canada, even if it could not match the income tax rate, as Venezuela had a 33% rate on corporations which could not be changed. All companies required majority in the projects, mainly because it was their own technology that would be used and because they were going into unknown territory.

This was not enough. In order to do the projects, PDVSA and its partners had to get quite creative with the financing in order to make it asufficiently ttractive. In those projects in which the projects issued bonds (Cerro Negro and Petrozuata), the parent companies offered guarantees on the bonds, which expired on the day the project reached its production potential. Moreover, because the length of the bonds was so long, the bonds were issued in most cases as “sinking fund”, which means that the bonds not only pay interest, but at some point in time also begin paying back capital every six months. Thus, when the bond matures at the end (The bonds had maturities from 12 to 30 years) you don’t get a final payment of 100%, but only a small fraction, as most of the bond has paid back its capital already. This structure has the advantage that even if the price of oil had fallen, the price of the bonds would not be impacted as much as it did not pay all of the capital at the end, but in steps with the interest payments.

Thus, not only were the projects risky, but to make interest payments attractive to investor, capital had to be paid early. Only in this manner was it possible to find financing for the projects at a level that would make it profitable, even if oil prices stayed down in the mid teens. Moreover, the projects had to create an escrow account abroad which had to contain sufficient funds to cover the next interest payment, as an additional sweetener to make the project’s financing possible.

The Venezuelan Congress approved the projects and only Causa R, the predecessor of part of PPT voted against it, together why three or four additional Deputies.

The projects had yet to produce a single barrel of oil when Hugo Chavez reached power. In fact, Chavez as late as 2001 was offering some of the same oil companies that were partners, additional projects in partnership with PDVSA and under the same conditions as the original projects. It is in the newspapers when Chavez hailed the projects and told the President of France’s Total that he was willing to start new projects under the same conditions (1% royalty and 33% tax with PDVSA a minority).

Then in 2004, after the projects’ bonds were quite depressed in 2003, oil prices jumped up and that is when PDVSA started reviewing the projects as the PDVSA representatives saw the huge increase in profits of the projects. At that time, PDVSA, in violation of the original contract, unilaterally told the projects that the 1% royalty would be increased to 16.5% even if the project had yet to reach the level of revenues required for that increase. None of them had.

The companies partnering accepted it, because they could do very little about it. They could go to Court locally. but were likely to lose and gain the antipathy of the Government and it was not worth going to international arbitration if you planned to have future projects in Venezuela.

About six months later, the Government and PDVSA struck again. First, they created a new “extraction tax” of 16% which is nothing more than an additional royalty on the oil, but also increased income taxes on the projects from 33% to 50%. Once again, the companies did nothing to stir the boat, fearing that local Courts would not benefit them and going to arbitration would be bad for future business. But clearly, the original contractual conditions had been unilaterally breached by the Venezuelan Government, even if the projects remained very profitable.

But note that Venezuela’s future competitive position has been weakened by these changes. Canada’s conditions have yet to change, if a company were considering the two it would obviously choose Canada, unless you have no expertise, are given special conditions and have to put up little money as Chavez and PDVSA have been doing recently to State Oil companies with no experience in the field.

The final drop to these companies came in 2006 when the Government announced, once again unilaterally and changing the same rules of the game the Venezuelan Ambassador to the US claims to want
ExxonMobil to respect
, that the partners had a date to give up controls of the projects, selling to PDVSA enough of their stake so that PDVSA would have 60% of each project at a price specified by PDVSA. PDVSA even had a price: the book value per share of the project, an absurd concept more so in an atmosphere of increasing oil prices. Even worse, if any partner did not want to accept the change, it had to leave the country and PDVSA would buy all of its stake, at the same low price.

The thinking was that everyone would accept, it was still a good business after all. However, it did not happen. Total and Statoil asked out of their project and ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips. also decided to leave the country. ConocoPhillips even wrote off the project as a loss, taking a big hit o its profits, while negotiating with PDVSA and then asking for arbitration in parallel with negotiations. ExxonMobil barely negotiated in the belief that PDVSA was not going to budge from its book value price and wanting to set an international precedent for the contracts it signs. It is after all a for profit institution.

Curiously, arbitration is guaranteed by a decree for the protection of investments issued by none other than…

Hugo Chavez in 1999…not the IVth. Republic… but that is a different story.

In any case, ExxonMobil went to arbitration, but the investors in the Cerro Negro project were left hanging. Under the terms of the original bonds, the expropriation of the partners, or change in partners became “default” events, but PDVSA was negotiating with the bond holders so as not to pay the steep premium required by the original conditions, but a smaller fee. In early December PDVSA agreed to pay about 30% of the original to bondholders and did so on December 27th. ExxonMobil waited until payment was made to introduce its injunctions all over the place. It did not want to hurt those that bought the bonds while ExxonMobil was running Cerro Negro. (No such an agreement has been reached for Petrozuata bondholders, which may be why ConocoPhillips has yet to be as aggressive)

Meanwhile, PDVSA has been selling parts of CITGO and not precisely at book value. I wonder what Ramirez and company would say if a US court valued CITGO at US$ 3 billion for the purposes of ExxonMobil’s injunction, that is precisely CITGO’s last published book value, but the company is probably worth around the US$ 12 billion asked by ExxonMobil.

And ExxonMobil did that, because of the mismanagement of PDVSA. If PDVSA’s cash flow was not as tight as it is, if the company did not need to borrow money abroad as much as it needs to and if the whole operation had not been mismanaged as badly as it has for the last few years, ExxonMobil’s injunction would be essentially meaningless. But ExxonMobil rather than wait three or four years for arbitration, want to negotiate a fair payment now. It is PDVSA that is weak, not ExxonMobil. And it is weak because of the mismanagement and treason, yes treason, of Hugo Chavez and Minister Ramirez who have run PDVSA as if it was their own political fiefdom and not for the benefit of all Venezuelans.

And while Ramirez and Chavez and today the former Attorney General, claim ExxonMobil’s injunction is exaggerated and should be overturned because PDVSA will pay whatever arbitration says, the truth is that everything that has been said and done in public points to exactly the opposite;

–Chavez #1 said last Sunday that he had ordered that Venezuela stop sending oil to the US if any of PDVSA’s assets were seized. This was pure bluff as some had already been seized. Of course, today Chavez #2 said that there is no plan to stop sending oil to the US, after Chavez #1 challenged the US to boycott Venezuela’s oil, which was simply mentioned in a Washington Post Editorial as something the US coudl do if it really wanted to ruin Hugo Chavez.

–Ramirez suggested that it would not pay what the arbitration Court said. he later denied it, saying he would pay but only up to book value, essentially ratifying what he had said earlier.

–The Venezuelan National Assembly passed a motion asking that Venezuela withdraw from the World Bank and thus withdrawing from CIADI, the World Bank’s body that is considering the arbitration between PDVSA and ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips.

—Venezuela announced that it would stop selling oil to ExxonMobil, which was in reality a lot of hot air, since it clarified that it would erspect all contracts leaving a rather insignificant amount of exports that could easily be sold to a trader and then to ExxonMobil, maybe the decision irrelevant.

All of these announcements made by the highest authorities of Venezuela work in ExxonMobil’s favor, as they clearly point to an unwillingness of Venezuela to pay or abide by the ruling of the Courts of other countries or honor the contracts that it signed and even the country’s laws and Constitution.

So, who is the traitor here?

The ones that have damaged Venezuela’s reputation or the ones that understand that the rule of law is essential for modern and developed contract?

We are not the traitors, the traitors are:

-The ones that have destroyed PDVSA capabilities for political purposes
-The ones that given away our oil for essentially free to other countries, while people live in extreme poverty and malnourished in Venezuela
-The ones that lie about PDVSA’s production figures
-The ones that not only fired 20,000 PDVSA workers, but boycotted them from working anywhere in Venezuela, forcing them to go find work for the competition abroad.
-The ones that have not invested in PDVSA for the future
-The ones that have not invested in maintenance, ruining oil wells.
-The ones that destroyed over a million barrels of oil production.
-The ones that destroyed INTEVEP, Venezuela’s world class research center on oil for their own political purposes.
-The ones that have not signed a single mayor new project in nine years (Remember Cristbal Colon, later Mariscal Sucre?)
-The ones that allow corruption to be rampant in PDVSA
-The ones that give fields and form partnerships with countries with no expertise and no money in oil.
-The ones that use PDVSA money to fund political projects and candidates in other countries
-The ones that want PDVSA to be “roja, rojita”
-The ones that violate people’s rights
-The ones that send suitcases full of cash for their pet projects
-The ones that use PDVSA as part of Chavez’ political party
-The ones that allow foreigners to decide and determine PDVSA’s future
-The ones that wiped out Orimulsion
-The ones that use PDVSA planes for personal vacations
-The ones that let the Government use PDVSA to solve its problems
-The ones that buyback PDVSA’s debt at a premium to save themselves from US legislation
-The ones that have eliminated transparency in PDVSA’s numbers
-The ones that sell bonds for PDVSA and assign them in arbitrary fashion

There are many more, the point is, THEY are the traitors and one day they will have to pay for it.

I will never forget or forgive them, will you?

A morning in the life of shortages…

February 17, 2008

Went out this morning like every Sunday to get the papers and a few things needed at home:

–At the first bakery, there was coffee but no milk, had it black. Bought bread even if it’s not my favorite, you never know if that other one will have it later. There was no cheese and the owner said he could not sell me any flour, it’s in short supply.

–First supermarket. There is no flour, no Coca Cola, no milk. there are eggs, only one type of cheese, not my favorite.

–Second bakery has no bread, no flour, didn’t even ask about my “marroncito”

–Second supermarket has some Coca Cola, no milk, no cheese, no flour.

–Third supermarket had the cheese, still no flour. Time to go home.

Thanks God I get El Nacional at home, for some reason, maybe unrelated to shortages, you could not get it at the stands as they did not receive it, which also happened yesterday.

Of course, for the Government this is all virtual, invented by the media…

Venezuelan St. Valentine humor

February 15, 2008

Venezuelan’s keep their sense of humor as proven by this St. Valentine’s card circulating in the Internet. It says:

On top: The more traditional can opt for a jewel or a perfume. The more daring for an afternoon in an Arab bath, or dinner in an aphrodisiac restaurant.

…the truly in love will search for the impossible!!!

(sugar, flower, rice, oil, coffee, corn flour, milk, cold medicine and eggs)

P.S, The coca plant, gives comfort to those afflicted, lowers appetite, the sense of fatigue and tiredness.

Comment by a PDVSA worker

February 15, 2008

Since most people do not read the comments in the blog I thought I would post here a comment made by a PDVSA worker:

“The only ones listening to the recent saber rattlings of Chavez and
Ramirez are the captive audiences of the “Nuevo PDVSA” employees for
fear of losing their new positions within the companies. From the anti
Exxon rallies Wednesday to the rumoured “Alo President” broadcast at
the Cero Negro facility Sunday, we have to put on our red shirts and
hats and cheer our support regardless of how stupid the message. Please
let this regime end quickly and allow Venezuela to become the
successful country it wants to be.”

 concerned

Thats is what this country has come to and what the workers of PDVSA have to endure. Very sad.

Mr. Chavez’s Bluff in The Washington Post

February 15, 2008

Mr. Chavez’s Bluff

If Venezuela’s strongman cut off oil exports to the United States, the first victim would be his regime.

Washington Post Friday, February 15, 2008; Page A20

ONE OF the more regrettable ironies of international relations is that the United States, through its voracious consumption of oil, underwrites President Hugo Chávez’s regime in Venezuela. In November alone, the United States bought more than 41 million barrels of Venezuelan crude, roughly 10 percent of all U.S. oil imports that month. If the Bush administration were really as committed to overthrowing Mr. Chávez as Mr. Chávez claims, the administration might be tempted to declare a boycott of Venezuelan oil. That would make a small but easily repaired dent in the U.S. economy, but it would devastate Venezuela, since it produces high-sulfur oil that, for the most part, can be refined only in special U.S.-based refineries.

So imagine our astonishment when Mr. Chávez himself threatened this week to cut off exports of crude oil to America. Perpetually angry at the United States, Mr. Chávez made this particular outburst because of his conflict with ExxonMobil, the American oil multinational whose operations in Venezuela he nationalized last year. While other oil companies accepted Mr. Chávez’s compensation terms and went quietly, Exxon Mobil fought the takeover through international arbitration and courts around the world. Last week, the company successfully moved to freeze $12 billion of Venezuelan assets, pending the outcome of the dispute. Enraged, Mr. Chávez announced: “If you end up freezing [Venezuelan assets] and it harms us, we’re going to harm you. Do you know how? We aren’t going to send oil to the United States.” In an interview published Tuesday in the Venezuelan newspaper Ultimas Noticias, Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez declared the country “ready” to make good on the threat.

But someone apparently explained to Mr. Chávez that Venezuela’s oil industry, already in decline because of Mr. Chávez’s mismanagement, might collapse if he actually carried out his threat. And without oil money, Mr. Chávez, who lost a referendum on extending his rule two months ago, cannot finance the subsidies and social spending that buy what’s left of his popular support in Venezuela. Mr. Chávez has now announced a modified, limited boycott: Henceforth, his state oil company will no longer sell crude directly to Exxon Mobil. This gesture will eventually prove meaningless as third parties come forward to buy the oil and then resell it to Exxon Mobil for refining. Also, Mr. Chávez’s government declared that the boycott does not apply to high-sulfur oil from the Cerro Negro field, which can be refined only at a facility that Venezuela and Exxon Mobil jointly operate in Chalmette, La. Two cheers for Exxon Mobil. In standing up to Mr. Chávez through peaceful, legal means, it has once again exposed the hollowness of the anti-imperialism with which he justifies his rule.

From simple stupidity to revolutionary comic relief

February 14, 2008

There has always been a very bizarre side to Chavez’ revolution. Bizarre in the way Government officials, including the leader himself, say absurd things or accuse the Empire or whatever obscure force they want to in being behind all of the problems the country faces. Then, there are the bombastic accusation such as murder plots, spying via Direct TV boxes or saying the CIA is in every corner of Venezuela sabotaging the actions of the revolution..

But lately, as the popularity of the Government has dropped like a stone and the infighting inside Chavismo has gained strength, things have actually become simply comical. While the whole thing may be too pathetic, one can only laugh at the things being said and the irresponsible behavior of Chavista Government officials and Deputies of the National Assembly as they all try to claim their revolutionary turf and look good in front of the autocrat. But in the end, all the comic relief does is accelerate the demise of the regime, as people are simply tired and find it hard to understand how yesterday’s heroes are today’s enemies. Additionally, people are beginning to blame Chavez and his Government for shortages and inflation, but see Chavez concerned more about international problems, instead of the reality the Venezuelan people are facing every day.

As Venezuela tries to defend itself from the asset freeze ordered by judges in three different countries, Chavismo tries to destroy with one hand what the very expensive lawyers PDVSA has hired are trying to accomplish with the other. Only yesterday, the lawyers were arguing that PDVSA was a serious company that would abide by the arbitration ruling whatever it may be, but then today the Venezuelan National Assembly, the same one that approved the expropriation of ExxonMobil’s stake in the Cerro Negro project, approves a motion encouraging the Government to withdraw from the World Bank.

Talk about being silly! You see, the arbitration panel in the contracts between PDVSA and ExxonMobil is an entity within the World Bank. Thus, by asking the Government to leave he World Bank, these Deputies are trying to prove exactly the opposite of what the Government’s lawyers are trying to show in Court. Even worse, when last year Chavez threatened to withdraw from the multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank, the idea was set aside when Government authorities realized that some of the country’s sovereign bonds would enter in default if Venezuela stopped being a member of these organization, something included in the prospectus of the bonds, mostly issued under Chavez, so you can’t blame the IVth. Republic for it. But the Deputies appear to have a short attention span and have already forgotten this important detail.

Then, of course, there is Minister of Energy and Oil Ramirez, who must be in Chavez’ doghouse, because he finds the need to speak daily on the subject of the freeze of assets by the international Courts. This can only hurt you, particularly when you speak as a revolutionary radical trying to make amends with your boss or addressing the populist gallery of Chavismo.

Ramirez first said that PDVSA needs to be as radical as possible with ExxonMobil. How silly can you be? You are trying to sell yourself in Court abroad as a serious oil company that will honor the results of the arbitration and then you say your should be as radical as possible. How stupid can you really be? It would be much better to just shut up. But the revolution as no control over itself.

Even worse, Ramirez makes statements that strictly speaking would get him into trouble, if there was rule of law in Venezuela. First he says that PDVSA owes at most US$ 750 million for its stake in Cerro Negro, the book value of the enterprise. This is stupid. First of all, book value would never be acceptable in any negotiation. But even worse, Venezuelan law would never allow him to pay more than what he said, so that if the arbitration panel said PDVSA has to pay more or if he negotiates a settlement which is higher, he could be jailed for paying more than it was worth it.

Even worse, Ramirez also made statements suggesting an agreement with ConocoPhillips was close, which may be the case, but it is clear PDVSA wold like to close the negotiation just to show the Courts it is willing to do it and it is ExxonMobil which is the bad guy. But until your agreement is final, all you are doing is giving an edge to your adversary in the negotiations. You never negotiate in public!

But the most comic relief was supplied by the Governor of Miranda State
Diosdado Cabello, who once had a positive image but is looking more and
more clownish with time. You see Cabello’s brother replaced Tax
Superintendent Vielma Mora recently. Vielma Mora, who is supposed to be
a good manager and very efficient, was suddenly replaced ostensibly to run
for Mayor of the Metropolitan area of Caracas. Apparently, this was
just an excuse and he was replaced because of some sort of monkey
business he was associated with.

No sooner was Cabellos’ brother appointed to the position, that Deputy
Luis Tascon, of fascist list fame, and one of the symbols of the
revolution, accused him of paying 50% more for some vehicles in his previous position at the Ministry of Infrastructure. But the robolution has yet to figure out how to deal with corruption after nine years in power, so the Head of the Comptrolling Commission of the National Assembly did not accept the evidence.

But even worse, Cabello decided to attack Tascon publicly today accusing him, please don’t laugh, of being an “instrument of the Empire”, that old worn out excuse for everything that goes wrong in the country. But just as I started laughing about tis, Cabello added: “That Deputy (Tascon) recently went and spent one month at Bill Gates’ office, the man that has the most money from informatics in the US. It must be that the injected him with a chip in his blood”

Jeez, this from the man that is supposed to be the smartest one around Chavez, the IT expert of the revolution, defending his brother at any cost with the silliest statement anyone could come up with. This is the guy that wants to succeed Chavez! No wonder this country is in such bad shape!

But by now, the whole thing is funny, as Chavez and his buddies try to be radical, when polls suggest people are tired of that. But there is nothing funny about rampant corruption, runaway inflation and shortages. But we have gone from the bizarre to the theatrical and the revolution seems simply to be striking a pose, a la Maddona, as if it were in charge, but it is clear it is in a disarray as everyone jockeys for position to survive a possible implosion of the revolution.

And there is nothing comic about that!!!

Federal Judge ratifies freeze of PDVSA assets

February 14, 2008

A Federal Judge in Manhattan ratified the freeze of over US$ 300 million ordered by a lower Court in the Sourthern District of New York in late December.

PDVSA’s “dream team” of lawyers tried to argue that the measure should be suspended because there was no ruling against PDVSA by the arbitration panel and the only requirement for PDVSA was to subject the case to arbitration. They argued that if PDVSA were to lose, it would abide by the decision and it made no sense to assume that ExxonMobil would receive no compensation.

Of course, the lawyers arguments contradicted most of the statements made by PDVSA and Venezulan Government officials this week who have been trying to argue the case publicly, threatening to cut off oil exports to the US if any of PDVSA’s property is frozen (will they announce it tomorrow?), arguing they will not pay if they lose in arbitration because tis is a sovereign issue and this is all a part of an economic boycott by the US Government. (I am sure the judge did not like this part). Moreover, PDVSA did not wait long to announce that it was stopping exports to Exxon, which while only a boast, given that contracts will be respected, is an announcement that had no place at this time given that it was Venezuela that expropriated ExxonMobil’s share of the heavy crude Cerro Negro plant without compensation. Thus, the Venezuelan authorities did not help their cause and the judge did not buy the arguments by the great team of PDVSA lawyers who have to carry the weight of Chavez and Ramirez around in their legal arguments.

On “The revolution on its path to suicide” by Heins Dieterich

February 13, 2008

After the Government’s loss in December’s referendum, German born Sociologist Heinz Dieterich wrote an essay, which was very critical of how Chavismo was handling things. What was most remarkable about it was that Dieterich, supposedly the intellectual creator of Chavez’ XXIst. Century Socialism seemed to be speaking with the same words the Venezuelan opposition does.

Today, Dieterich’s latest piece reaches me and I find it remarkable how lucid it is, given that it is not an economist talking, but an educated sociologist, who seems to understand how the world works better than any of the men Chavez has put in the Ministry of finance or the Ministry of Planning in the last nine years. (There was one woman, but she was a leftover from Caldera’s time and she was quite knowledgeable).

Unfortunately, Dieterich’s solution to “saving” the revolution is as bad and absurd as the actions and the policies he criticizes Chavez for: He wants more stop gap policies and wasteful solutions so that Chavez can win the election and have the people pay the price later in the form of more shortages, distortions and inflation.

The truth is that Chavez failed to use his popularity to attempt to fix the problems creating too many new ones as I have detailed before in this blog. Dieterich is quite clear in his Draconian criticism of Chavez, his policies, his Government and the people that surround him. In fact, he is so critical, that he runs the risk of being accused of being an agent for the Empire.

I have not found a copy of the document on the Internet, I am sure it will show up soon, Tal Cual published a copy today, but it is by subscription only. Here are the highlights:

The revolution on its path to suicide by Hans Dieterich

1.Chavez has yet to assume the lesson from December 2nd.

Chavez’ defeat on December 2nd. 2007 was not a small misstep, as the President seems to think, but a qualitative change in the correlation of forces.That is why it is hard to understand why the President continues to apply a discursive-political-economic model, which failed on December 2nd.

The pre-December continuism is evident: there has not been a serious debate about the defeat: the critics and self-criticism of Government officials have been rhetorical; the dominant fraction of the New Political Class has been strengthened: the naming of improvised Ministers for the important Cabinet position continues and the behavioral structure continues to be alive. In two fronts of continuism, economic policy and the discourse, are the real dangers to his own future.

2. How the Government functions.

In this section Dieterich talks about recent announcements by the Government, which generate inflation, but then blames the private sector for it.

3. Incongruous economic discourse by the Government

The Governments economic discourse is superficial and it does not take advantage of its control of state media to give the population a real economic conscience of the situation. With frequency it is mostly rhetoric or mystification (of the problems)

Or can any economist find any sense in the following statement by the Minister of Planning that “the inflation we are having is the product of inertia. Inertial effects tend to stabilize in the medium term”. This is misinforming people, because all economists know that the peak in inflation was generated by bonuses, massive outflows of additional monetary liquidity, motivated mainly by the referendum and the easy credit given to the banking system.

What seriousness in terms of information can one give to the Minister of Feeding when he says that “it is not a secret that foodstuffs like rice, wheat and corn are going to enter critical shortages due to worldwide shortages due to the insistence by the empire of using them as bio fuels.” The reality is that in 2007 barely 1.25% of the productive land of the world is being used for bio fuels and the main factor in the price increases is the large growth of China, India and Russia and the economic recovery of Latin America:

The President also generates illusions when he says when increasing the price of milk. “I hope producers respond, instead of making cheese or taking it to Colombia, which I consider to be treason, a s that milk is for Venezuelans” In a chrematistic economic, and Venezuela is a chrematistic economy of markets, economic activity is founded on the basis of profit and interest, not based on value judgments such as fatherland or treason: until Chavez introduces structures of value in the economy, complaints about patriotism are worthless.

And the President generates an illusion when he says that he will expropriate the great food and medicine production networks. If today he is not capable of guaranteeing chicken and milk in the markets, with what state logistic will he substitute the function of those same networks? Why threaten, Sun Tzu used to say, if you cannot fulfill your threats?

4. Inflation and shortages in the light of economic science

(After describing the economic variables and relation between goods and money, Dieterich then describes how inflation and its counterpart deflation originate as disequilibrium between money and supply of goods and then):

The main causes of inflation are four: 1) Increase in the price of imports. 2) Economic boycott. 3) A natural catastrophe and 4) A disproportionate increase in monetary liquidity. The first two factors are the main argument in the Government’s discourse, the third does not apply in Venezuela and the fourth is the fundamental factor in Venezuela’s inflation. (You’ve read that here before, no?)

The shortages in merchandise in a chrematistic economy occurs when the sale price (profit margin) are not attractive for the producer or seller (capitalist). This is the case of Venezuela. Many of the prices fixed by the State which affect 400 items are so low that the offer of products disappears, either because they stop producing or because they sell in markets with higher prices, such as Colombia or black markets.

5. Economic policy and the political future of Hugo Chavez

When inflation reached 17% in 2006, the Government established an official inflation target of 12%. That target was not reached. According to the Central Bank, the CPI was 22.55. However, if you take into account that many of the basic goods have frozen prices, it is realistic to assume that real inflation was around 28%. Such a high rate has two negative consequences: It destroys both the economy as well as the Government responsible for it.

One has to mention, of course, black markets and hoarding for speculative purposes as negative factors for the Government’s policies. This, however, with two considerations: a) its causes are more economic than political, resulting from the distortion of relative market prices and b) the only way to end with these are economic mechanisms, not police or political ones.

6. Electoral Year 2008: How to avoid an economic-political crisis?

The massive injection of money in the economy in electoral times for any Government and even in some cases, price controls and basic services is quite normal. This recipe was possible for electoral year 2006 and electoral year 2007, but in this manner, it’s dysfunctional and unsustainable for electoral year 2008.

To control inflation and end shortages, the President only has two options: a) Reduce excess liquidity via fiscal policies (higher taxes) monetary (interest rates) or redistribution. b) Assume as the State the cost of inflation. Option (a) will not be applied in an election year. Option (b) requires that you resolve the cost-benefit relatio
nship to small and medium size producers via realistic prices with guarantees or subsidies. It is a rentist model such as those of small farmers in the European Union or the US, but guarantees the political loyalty of those social classes and will allow time to look for a way out of the economic straight jacket self imposed by price controls.

Combined with that you need a massive program of imports in which the State will assume all of the expenses that exceed desired prices. Even if the price of oil oscillates between $65 and $80 the Venezuelan state will have sufficient capacity (I disagree with this). There is probably no time to create the logistics before the November 2008 elections, which means you have to use existing infrastructure. Only the church, the schools and the military have the presence in all corners of the country:

This is the only remaining path left to the President to avoid a crisis in 2008: To find the required inputs the President will have to get rid of the courtesan feuds of the New Political Class that surround him. If he can’t or does not want to take that step, in December 2008 he will repeat at a much larger scale what he had to love on December 2nd. 2007.

7. The ethics of truth and the President’s dilemma

One of the most worrisome political phenomena in the Venezuelan process is the growing emptiness of the ethical discourse of the Government. Instead of explaining scientifically (!) reality to the citizens, they are treated discursively with the same manipulative techniques used by bourgeois Governments. With that procedure you don’t create revolutionary conscience but clientele.

To the atrophy to the discursive veracity you have to add the progressive exhaustion of the two strategic discourses of the President: Bolivarianism and XXIst. Century Socialism. The first, because it does not offer new horizons internally in the country and the second, because the President has not created even one single economic institution qualitatively different from market economies, that is, post-capitalist.

The President faces the following dilemma: either he breaks with the pre-December status quo or continuism will end up being the end of the Bolivarian revolution.

From self-sufficiency to self-destruction in the Chavez era

February 12, 2008

Apparently the robolution of Hugo Chavez has decided that it is better to destroy the country for the sake of ideology than to reverse course on the failed policies of the last nine years as Hugo Chavez has ruled Venezuela as if it were his private farm, using his naive beliefs as to how things should work but, despite failure after failure, the decision is to stay the course, the country be damned.

Long gone are the days of hailing revolutionary “self-sufficiency”� as every single sector the revolution has tried to fix or adapt to its ideology is now broken by failure.

Large farm estate were expropriated, mostly without compensation of any kind and distributed in small lots to farmers that have long gone abandoned them, as the absence of know-how, advise and more importantly, financing, doomed them to failure from day one. Not only were the sizes of the plots of land too small, but since farmers were not given ownership, they had no property to guarantee loans and the famed agricultural loans at special interest rates have gone to the usual suspects: The few profitable agro-industrial enterprises in the hands of those with knowledge, experience and yes, with money, who mostly arbitrage the financial system, borrowing at preferential rates and depositing in those banks paying high yields in their deposit accounts. Or maybe simply buying US dollars in the “non-existent” parallel swap market, paying rates below local inflation and waiting for further devaluations of the currency.

Of course, the robolution also tried to get into the more industrial part of the agricultural business importing plants from Cuba for sugar processing all of which, yes all of them, are behind three years, creating further bottlenecks to the few hard souls that remained in the fields most of which abandoned sugar for crops not under regulation or which the Government has paid little attention to.

Five years of controlled prices, combined with five years of 18% average inflation have destroyed the country’s productive industries, while the Government continues to import at the official exchange rate now in its fourth continuous year at Bs. 2,150 per US$. Small increments in prices have lately been approved, at an incredibly slow pace (it was time for rice this week), but new regulated prices are imposed, insuring that nobody will make any new investments.

And if things are not working, why not intervene customs at the country’s biggest port to “audit”� where food imports are going, as if auditing them at the source will in any way change where they end up. But such is the revolution, naive, inefficient and incompetent. Who cares if you introduce weeks of delays in the middle of the biggest food shortages the country has ever experienced? The private sector can sustain the losses.

Those near the border are detained as being suspect of smuggling things into Colombia, while the reality is that people actually now go to Colombian border towns to fill up on the overflowing shelves of Colombian supermarkets in marked contrast to the empty ones on this side of the revolution.

But rather than admit the failure of the ignorant and naive policies invented by the autocrat, the reaction is to have PDVSA distribute food, threaten industries with expropriation via illegal decrees, even suggest some will be expropriated if they don’t sell their products to the Government as if it had some form of pecking order above the efficient distribution to the people.

Things are so ridiculous that milk producers are even accused of dumping milk in rivers, never producing a proof, the revolution is always right, it is private enterprise who represents the devil, the empire and yes, the CIA in the form of Bush or whomever may be elected in November from Obama to Huckabee.

To say nothing of the famous cooperatives, mostly inoperative and defunct, with billions wasted in Government financing to projects doomed to failure from day one, as predicted in this blog. Invepal may be the most dramatic case, in which a company in operation was taken over, without compensation to the owners or banks that had lent it money, only to see it disappear, together with the Deputy who made it her showcase to fame, but who carefully stays away from the same workers she drove to this crazy adventure into obvious self-destruction.

Today, to insure the final destruction of the agricultural sector the Government announces massive imports of milk, meat and wheat at the official rate of exchange just to insure wiping out local industry before they leave. All in exchange for oil, of which we have less and less as the days go by.

And then there is the Venezuelan oil industry, the same one that everyone thought was impossible to destroy. By now, even the cheerleaders of the robolution are convinced that the fabled 3.3 millions of barrels of oil a day only exist in Rafael Ramirez’ imagination. The true number is around 2.4 to 2.5 million barrels a day. With an irresponsible subsidy for gasoline and imported cars (for the rich!), gasoline consumption has gone from 420,000 barrels of gasoline a day to 700,000, barely leaving some 1.7-1.8 millions of barrels of oil for exports, as the remainder is being subsidized by a company with cash flow problems, on top of US$ 12 billion in social spending, no investment in increasing production and US$ 15 billion in gas subsidies.

Just think, at US$ 100 per barrel, PDVSA receives US$ 63 billion a year for its exports, or US$ 5.25 billion per month, not far from the US$ 3.8 billion given out by CADIVI, the foreign exchange control office in January, which corresponds to US$ 74 per barrel, scarily close to today’s value and a clear indication of how stretched things are in Venezuela, with a recession looming in the US and maybe the world.

Add to that the firing of the country’s oil workforce, 20,000 strong, increasing personnel from 42,000 before the firings at PDVSA to 70,000 today and putting the company in the hands of the incompetent and ignorant and you have a recipe for self-destruction. PDVSA is destructible after all.

And as PDVSA begins to feel the cash flow crunch, you expropriate your partners without fair compensation, hoping against all hopes that oil will continue to go up to save the day once again. And your partners will bow to the autocrat.

Then one day one of them does not, and decides to try to get fair payment. You invoke sovereignty at the same time you violated it, firing 20,000 of your best advisers for political reasons, or compromised oil production with future sales, which is forbidden by the country’s legislation. Then you accuse the empire, bully it that you will do what you have never prepared yourself to do: cutting off oil supplies to the US Or, like today, saying you cut off oil supplies to Exxon. But wait; there is a footnote in your pompous announcement, “except for valid contracts”. Since almost all the oil you sell to Exxon is under these contracts then these are empty words, traders (your own?) can buy the rest from you and then resell it to Exxon and no harm done. But the medium is the message and the robolution is all messages, no substance as nine years of it demonstrates.

And the robolutionaries add to the histrionics, suggesting that the Prosecutor accuse of treason the members of Congress that were part of the oil opening which allowed the heavy rude partnership, when over 95% of the Deputies approved these contracts in the mid nineties. The suggestion is as ignorant as everything in the revolution, as many of the now Chavistas Deputies and officials, such as Rodrigo Cabezas, Minister of Finance until the end of 2007 were part of that almost unanimous majority which approved this “treason” against the Nation. Are we all traitors after all?

And then there is corruption. From suitcases full of cash, to financial transactions to the outright stealing of money, never has Venezuela, or any other country for that matter seen the dance of billions in corruption we have seen. A Russian friend was in Caracas rec
ently and after a few days talking to analysts and Government officials, told me that prior to his visit he had thought his country to be the most corrupt in the world, but it was little comfort to see Venezuela top it as easy as it seems to be doing it.

Lost in the PDVSA/Exxon shuffle was the sale of the Fonden structured notes to some “friendly” banks last Ftiday in order to move down the parallel swap market, which according to the National Assembly does not exist. A strange priority to have when the swap rate is not under pressure, as the Government self-induced liquidity crisis has kept it low recently.

Until you see the numbers and realize the notes are sold to friendly banks at 105% at the official rate of exchange of Bs. 2.15 per US$ Thus one million dollars cost you 2.2575 million Bolivars. But the notes can be sold for 60%, so you only get US$ 600,000 for them, but you can sell these dollars at Bs. 5 per US$, or a cool profit 850 thousand Bolivars 1.4 per dollar from which you have to subtract the commissions to those handing out this largesse to these friendly banks, for their “intermediation” efforts, or a cool 62% profit between “bankers” and handlers. Maybe they have no time to get rich like their predecessors and thus the rush.

It is as if lost in its own incompetence, the Government has decided to hand an empty shell to whomever or whatever is the opposition when this all self-destructs. Except that this is spiraling down so fast, that while they may be thinking they can survive for at least a year, their own actions will precipitate their own and revolutionary demise before the dawn of 2009.

How much does PDVSA owe ExxonMobil for its 42.5% stake in Cerro Negro?

February 10, 2008

Today, El Universal says that Ecoanalitica calculates that the value of Cerro Negro as a firm is around US$ 3.4 billion and Exxon’s compensation should be in the range of US$ 1.3 billion, well below the injunction values of US$ 12 billion requested by ExxonMobil.

The number seems low to me when compared to similar companies abroad. The problem is that it is not always easy to make such comparisons not only because the companies are in different countries, but also because Cerro Negro as a company had no future expansion, while companies like Suncor in Canada, against which we can measure Cerro Negro are aggressively expanding their productions.

But we can take a stab by looking at the numbers. Suncor today had a Price/Earnings ratio of 22, a Price to sales ratio of 3, a price to cash flow of 13.4 and a Price to Book ratio of 4.

While I have not seen a cash flow statement from Cerro Negro or earnings recently, we can try to narrow it down.

The easiest one is Price to Sales. Suncor sells US$ 13.5 billion per year, while my estimate for Cerro Negro sales are US$ 3.0 billion. Thus, this would suggest a price of US$ 9 billion for Cerro Negro, except that you would have to lower the value not only because it is in Venezuela, but also because taxes and royalties are much higher in Venezuela for these companies. How much higher? Well, royalties are 30% in Venezuela and the tax rate is 50%, compared to 16.5% and 25% in Alberta.

In terms of earnings, I estimate Cerro Negro makes about US$ 350 million a year, which would give US$ 7 billion if it had a similar P/E as Suncor, but it should be lower because of the higher risk premium of being in Venezuela.

In terms of book value, My memory suggests that this was around US$ 1.5 billion which places an equivalent number of 4 for Suncor around US$ 6 billion.

As you can see, all of the numbers I get are above US$ 6 billion which should be an upper bound given that this is a project in Venezuela. If we assume that the risk premium shaves off 25% of the value, which is reasonable, then the numbers would be from US$ 4.5 billion to US$ 7.2. Since ExxonMobil owned 42.5% of Cerro Negro, then this implies that ExxonMobil is owed somewhere between US$ 1.9 and US$ 3 billion, well below the numbers of the injunction and certainly not something PDVSA (or Fonden) can not afford to pay at this time.

The main difference between Ecoanalitica’s estimate and our own is that Ecoanalitica uses the value of the settlement between PDVSA and Sincor as a benchmark, but I believe this was a substantially low value than the true worth of that company.