Archive for the 'Uncategorized' Category

The Fonden Papers Part V: More Information Suddenly Available

September 3, 2011

In a very interesting development, all of a sudden there seems to be a rush to have information about Fonden out in the open. For example, after the public absence of any financial statements from the fund since 2007, as if by magic, you can now find 2009 and 2010, as seen below here:

Notice however, that in the rush to complete the information, they somehow either missed or did not have the Financials for 2008, and the information jumps from 2007 to 2009. Two weeks ago, all that was available was up to the 2007 financials. Clearly, there is an attempt, probably in reaction to Deputy Ramos’ accusations, to add information and then say it was there all along. Pity I did not save a picture two weeks ago, but there is more..

Another “new” feature is that what used to be a list of projects without any content, now has a full description of each project, who is executing it, like for example, this rice project:

Where you now can see the information of how much was given to whom, who is executing the project, how much has been disbursed. The contractor is not named, just the Government organization that is in charge of execution. But this is the type of information that was not available before and now “magically” is on the web page.

In fact, you can search for the information in different ways, you can find all of the projects, you can find them by state or you can find it by organization executing the project. Funny thing is that in the rush to provide more and more information, the last list is simply a list of all Government organizations, even if they are not executing projects or maybe the information has yet to be updated.

For example, in this page you find a list of institutions “executing” projects:

Curious about seeing a list of projects executed by the Fondo Nacional de Ciencia Tecnologia e Innovacion, I clicked on it and despite the fact that I know there are projects in that area, there is no information:

So, either this is a comprehensive list of institutions or they are still upgrading the information. I suspect it is a combination of both.

While I have not studied the details, there are more than the 140 projects here than the list given by Minister Giordani to the National Assembly. That list seems to be a global list of projects, this list has the detailed information. More work to be done, help will be welcome!

Seems like there is an attempt to make the information public and claim it has been there all along and make Deputy Ramos look bad or make noise about it, but these pages will show at least the evidence of what happened in time.

Hugo Chavez’ Physical Evolution part II, July 17th. to August 28th.

August 30, 2011

On July 16th. I showed the evolution of Hugo Chavez’ physical appearance during the time before and after his cancer was revealed. In this post, I show the evolution since then, using the same method of cropping his face from the front page of Correo del Orinoco. The order of the pictures is: From top left on: July 17th., July 22nd., July 25th. and Aug 6th. for the first square of four. The second one is Aug. 7th., Aug. 15th. , Aug. 22nd.and  Aug. 23,  and the last one is Aug. 24th., Aug 25th., Aug. 26th. and Aug. 28th.

Anyone that says he looks good, or has not changed, better take a look this carefully, it is after all, a 42 day span.

And BTW, what’s with the glasses? From none to high correction? Can anyone explain this?

Venezuelan Military Officers are Expensively Educated in Belarus far from Billo’s Cadets

August 29, 2011

It was a famous Billo’s song, the type of music that every Venezuelan has danced to at one point in their lives:

Por la puerta de mi casa en correcta formación
van pasando los cadetes que hoy están de graduación
unos son de la marina, otros son de la aviación
otros guardias nacionales y oficial en formación
.
La marina tiene un barco, la aviación tiene un avión
los cadetes tienen sable y la guardia su cañon
pero lo que más me gusta y me llena de emoción
es que pasen por mi casa en correcta formación

I guess the Cadetes are no more. Or at least, the Chavez Government wants a different type of Cadete. Why do I say that? Because under line 47 of the Fonden Papers, you can read:

“Providing training services for forty (40) cadets of the Bolivarian Armed Forces of Venezuela, according to the Program of Study of the Military Academy of Belarus”

Approved for the project: US$ 9,931,928.55, yeah, about ten million bucks!

Thus, we are talking in Fonden nomenclature (down to the cent) of US$ 248,298.21 per cadet.

Definitely not your Billo’s Caracas Boys Cadets at that price. In the sixties, you could get Billo to play 10 sets for about US$ 1,100 in one evening. But I digress.

Now, I don’t know how long it takes to train a cadet, but given that they are trainees, it is hard to imagine it can take longer than three years. It just so happens, that the Belarus Embassy in Italy has a brochure for the Military Academy and it clearly says that tuition is about US$ 5,900 per year on page 124 or maybe as high as US$ 6,000 per year in page 125. Let’s be generous, let’s give each cadet US$ 2,000 per month in stipend and the total cost comes to US$ 80,000 per cadet. Thus, either the Belarussians or someone else must be pocketing some US$ 168,298.21 dollars per cadet. No?

Sounds like the Cuban health outsourcing deal once again, but this time with Belarus.

But unless the Belarus Military Academy can turn Venezuelan trainees into super human military officers, why can’t the Venezuelan Military Academy train 40 cadets per year? I am sure they could use those 9,931,928.55 bucks in their budget.

And the cadets could march to Billos’ songs to boot!

Gaddafi on being rebuffed by Hugo Chavez and other Hugo tales

August 29, 2011

Reportedly this is a conversation between Gaddafi and his son, in which he refers to our august leader in no uncertain terms:

I don’t know what  this bloated Venezuelan dog thinks. Chavez is a coward. He has  sold himself to the Zionists. Yesterday, when probed about the possibility of moving to Venezuela in case the unthinkable happens, he began to falter like the eunuch comedian that used to make my grandfather laugh. He is a dog traitor. He told me it was not convenient for me to stay in Venezuela. And all the attentions we had for this devil!  The Libyan people’s wealth at their disposal. Our revolutionary wisdom. When he learned that we had put his name to the stadium in Benghazi he began to cry, like a mourner of the desert! Treating me like this, supposedly a comrade, a universal leader, a recognized giant of world revolution. Chavez is a miserable wimp, an impostor. A lot of verbal diarrhea, but where is the help he promised? He is unable to take risks, to confront their enemies with violence. As we have done, liquidating traitors, here and abroad. And will continue to do …

That Chavez is almost as rogue as Berlusconi. Because the Venezuelan is an opportunist masquerading as a revolutionary. Instead Berlusconi behaved with us like an open cynic, a gangster in love with gold.

I love the “opportunist masquerading as a revolutionary” part, I guess it takes one to know one…

I have no clue if the above story is true, but apparently Chavez does not even believe that the scenes from Tripoli are real, believing that it was all taped in Qatar using professional actors:

And just to make the point he once again questions whether the US got to the moon, using the old: Is there wind on the moon? in reference to the American flag on the pictures. I am sure the Cabinet took notice of his wise words.

Smoking Egg Rolls in Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution

August 21, 2011

“Fumarse una lumpia” or smoking an egg roll is a Venezuelan way of saying someone had to smoke something really weird in order to have said something so silly or absurd. Aristobulo Isturiz used that sentence to refer to Hugo Chavez a long time ago, but soon after that he rejoined his Government and even was Minister of Education, which showed his ideological consistency.

But in the video above, Hector Navarro, who has been Minister of a variety of things with Chavez, appears to have smoked a gold dusted egg roll when in min. 4.35 or so he says “It is crazy to pay someone else to custody our gold without getting any interest”

Jeez, a gold bugs dream! You not only speculate with the gold but get interest on it!

I wonder where Minister Navarro thinks this “interest” would be coming from? From the dust that comes off the gold bars?

There are other pearls in the video (Sorry, it is a little long!) like when he says there will be a financial crash because of the money printing by the Obama administration. I wonder if he has noticed that Giordani’s money printing since Chavez took power has been 17 times larger than that of the US in the same period (Factor of 2 for the US, factor of 35 for Venezuela). I guess in that case Venezuela will not suffer a financial crash, but a financial avalanche…

Navarro is the same guy who said the gold report had been leaked by the CIA. I always wonder why these guys never seem to worry about how the CIA obtained the documents.

It must be the gold dust in the egg rolls that limits the thinking…

(Kudos to reader JMA for noting this jewel by Navarro and captainccs for providing the link!)

S&P last to downgrade Venezuela to B level

August 19, 2011

So, S&P decided to downgrade Venezuela’s debt to B+ today.

Let’s put this in perspective first, there are three large rating agencies which people follow (there are more, but they generate less noise): Fitch, S&P and Moody’s. Of the three, the only one that still had Venezuela at the “BB” level was S&P. The other two had Venezuela at B+ (Fitch) and B2 (Moody’s). The latter rating, B2, is exactly one notch below B+ and is equivalent to S&P’s and Fitch’s “B”.

Thus, S&P was the first of the agencies to downgrade the US to AA+, but it was the last to downgrade Venezuela to B+ (Six levels below that of the USA, so much for Giordani’s claim of a crisis in the USA, ignoring his)

In any case, part of the reason that S&P cites for downgrading Venezuela is that it actually has changed its methodology and is giving more weight than it used to, to political risks. But it does mention that both Chavez’ illness and the repatriation of the country’s reserves had an important influence on the decision.

In any case, Venezuela trades with yields that are more like CCC or CC than B.

The rest? Well, nothing you don’t know about, but here is the economic part in the S&P report:

“In our opinion, changing and arbitrary laws, price and exchange controls, and other distorting and unpredictable economic measures have undermined private-sector investment and hurt productivity–weakening Venezuela’s domestic economy.    Furthermore, the recent developments regarding President Hugo Chavez’s health could add to policy uncertainty. The country’s vast oil and gas reserves, which are key positives in external and fiscal performance, somewhat offset the policy uncertainty. Venezuela regularly posts current account surpluses and–with capital outflows constrained by foreign exchange controls–records a net external asset position.    The current account surplus improved to 6.1% of GDP in 2010 from 2.6% in 2009, and it likely will remain at a similarly strong level in 2011 because of higher oil prices. As a result, Standard & Poor’s expects the central bank’s foreign exchange reserves, which have covered seven or more months of current account payments in recent years, to remain fairly stable. That said, recent reports about plans to repatriate the sovereign’s gold reserves as well as foreign exchange add uncertainty to the actual level of those reserves. We expect that economic activity, which was hurt by several factors in 2010, to recover in 2011, fueled by government spending. As a result, real GDP per capita likely will expand by 1.4% in 2011. However, the heavy spending levels in preparation for the 2012 presidential election likely will take the general government deficit to 2.5% of GDP in 2011 and about 4% in 2012.  “

Looking into Venezuela’s future: Miraflores, February 4th. 2013

August 16, 2011

(The following scene was prompted by a discussion in this post in Quico’s and Juan’s blog)

Miraflores Palace, evening of Monday, February 4th., the day the new Venezuelan President was sworn in. The President asks to be connected to Raul Castro and his side of the conversation goes something like this:

-Hello Sr. Castro, is President O from Venezuela.

-Thank you, thank you. It was a hard campaign and harder now, but ready to start doing things. In any case, I am calling you after the first Cabinet meeting, which ended about half an hour ago. We have looked at what we pay for your Doctors and will unilaterally change the terms starting tomorrow. Basically, we will pay US$ 400 per month per Doctor for sixteen months a year, which amounts to US$ 128 million and we will pay the Cuban Government a 20% outsourcing fee, for a total of 153.6 million a year, which we will pay at the end of each month to each doctor and we will transfer the outsourcing fee to you.

-Oh, yes indeed, US$ 400 per month is less than what a Venezuelan Doctor makes, so you do know what a Venezuelan Doctor makes? How interesting! Well, we provide housing and utilities for your Doctors Sr. Castro, thus the difference. As for transportation charges to and from Cuba, don’t worry, we will take care of that for you from now on, we have to create some jobs and that sounds like a good way to do it.

-I know Sr. Castro, we all have problems, imagine mine with the debt and the holes Hugo left all over the place. But just think, if I send back the Doctors, you will have 20,000 more mouths to feed, I am not sure you want that either.

-No Sr. Castro, I can not add US$ 10 million more to help you out. I mean, Haiti wants only US$ 5 million and I have to wait to decide on that. And they are starving there.

-Ok, good, I am glad you understand, we have a deal on the Doctors then. The second point Sr. Castro, is that we are suspending all oil shipments to Cuba, we have noticed you have yet to make an interest payment since 2003, you had two years grace period, but it has been now ten years without a single penny coming our way.

-I know, I know, don’t get upset. We have problems too, Hugo left US$ 150 billion in debt and we are trying to put the house in order. I know you need the oil, but we also know that Cuba does not use as much oil as Venezuela sends there. We are just asking everyone that is behind on the interest payments to pay, we can negotiate terms, but also all terms will be equal to all countries, except Haiti, of course. Essentially, it’s 50% within thirty days and the remainder in 25 years, but we will charge market rates for the 25 year financing, we have our own load to pay. As for the Cienfuegos refinery, we rebuilt it for free and we have been providing the oil you sell in the international markets for three years, so we really should own it. But don’t worry, we don’t plan to make such a claim.

-Yes, I understand I can not leave Cuba without oil, but we have to negotiate payment for 12 years of oil, if you want us to send some oil, send your Minister of Finance and I am sure we can find 10 o 20 thousand barrels a day to give you a hand temporarily until you can adjust.

-I know, things are hard everywhere, but just think, with these measures Venezuela will save some US$ 16 billion a year, which means we will not incur in any new debt in the upcoming years, except with multilateral organizations. With these loans, we will buy back some debt at cheaper rates and essentially have the macro part fixed, so we can work on the hard parts, the people, reconciliation and the financial mess at every local Government institution.

-Oh yes, your country has done a great service to Venezuela in providing health care. But I am not sure it applies to the case you mention. After all, he is not amongst us now, is he?

-Goodnight Raul.

Not Much To The “Move” in Venezuela’s International Reserves

August 15, 2011

I found this report about Venezuela moving its international reserves somewhat funny. Really. What’s the problem?

In reality, there isn’t much to move in the end and I would like to see if it is true that Venezuela will move back its 11.76 million Troy ounces of gold. To give you an idea, 11.76 million Troy ounces of gold happens to be some 365 Tons of gold. Since each Ton is about 907 Kilos, that is a lot to move back to Venezuela. About 150 armored trucks at each end. Moreover, strategically, having it abroad is better for the Government, they can sell it and nobody would even know.

I had not looked at Venezuela’s gold reserves in a while, but a comment from a reader made me look and calculate again and lo and behold, Venezuela’s International reserves are roughly at the same level as Jan. 1st of this year, only because gold has gone up a lot this year. The graph below shows the value of the gold in the country’s reserves, where I have used the accounting of the Venezuelan Central Bank, which according to the auditors is that the price used is the average for the last 60 days:

As you can see, gold reserves have gone up from a bit above US$ 16.25 billion on Jan. 1st., to roughly US$ 18.4 billion on August 10th., for a difference of US$ 2.15 billion dollars. Given that reserves were US$ 28.77 billion that same day, this means that reserves have actually dropped US$ 1.47 billion since Jan. 1st (when they stood at US$ 30.24 billion) despite much higher oil prices. But since gold reserves have gone up by US$ 2.15 billion, it turns out that reserves are down even more than it appears at first sight, a total of US$ 3.6 billion.

But more importantly, of the US$ 28.77 billion, US$ 18.4 billion were gold, that represents essentially 64% of all reserves. Thus, the reserves that can really be moved, since I don’t believe the gold will be moved, is “only” US$ 10.37 billion dollars. I think gold reserves should be here anyway.

Except form that you have to subtract about US$ 2.08 billion of “special drawing rights” which Venezuela has at the IMF, which would only leave US$ 8.29 billion to move.

Then, the Central Bank bought US$ 1.7 billion from PDVSA in the PDVSA 2013 bond and was assigned about US$ 1 billion of the Global 2031 bond, that’s US$ 2.7 billion of Venezuelan bonds, which in the end it does not matter whether they are here or in Ruanda, we know the owners and the Central Bank needs them close and handy to sell into the SITME foreign exchange system. Subtract those US$ 2.7 billion and you have US$ 5.59  billion to “move”. Then there is Venezuela’s contribution to the IMF, about US$ 300 million and you have only US$ 5.29 billion.

There could be other things, but we don’t find out about them until its very late. The Central Bank regularly lends money to PDVSA, we don’t know when they do it, we know when it gets paid back. Suppose that’s zero right now and this “newsy” move would apply to about US$ 5 billion in investments.

Five billion? In a country where a US$ 29 billion discrepancy does not even make the news except in obscure blogs one and/or two?

Who cares if they move it?

Note added: Here is the “Punto de Cuenta” for the transfer of reserves. The proposal is indeed to transfer the “operating reserves” within two months. There is a longer term plan to move the gold back to Venezuela (What is not in Venezuela). However, it says this will violate the rules. Now, the reason seems to be to protect them form being frozen by the Federal Reserve. Whether they are in Switzerland (where 60% are) or in the US, if it is part of the compensation system and they are worried the funds can be frozen. This may have to do with the concerns about helping Iran and that the US imposes a financial ban on Venezuela. But it may also have to do with fears that Exxon will sue to freeze Venezuelan assets if it wins the arbitration case. I would bet is the former, not the latter, sovereign nations have protection from such suits.

Now, the US$ 5.25 billion figure is even lower, because there are about US$ 900 million more in there that is not that liquid that I had not counted, so we are talking about US$ 4.3 billion in the end.

The mystery of the “Narco Avioneta” captured in Western Venezuela

August 14, 2011

The bizarro world that Venezuela has become allows for everything, there are no longer surprises, least of all if our military is involved. The same military that has been talking openly about staging a coup, should Venezuelans choose a leader different than Chavez in the 2012 elections.

But the military does not seem to answer to anyone anymore in Chavezlandia. The latest bizarre episode already has a leading hashtag in Twitter: #narcoavioneta. You see, a small plane was captured in Falcon state full of drug, some 1,400 kilograms of cocaine was found in it.

Website lapatilla.com has raised numerous (here, here, here) questions about this case, including the fact that it is supposedly not registered in Venezuela, despite having a registration number painted on it and freely and liberally flying around the country.

Now, I don’t know much about the case and its details, whether it was or not registered, where the drug was loaded onto it, whether the two people killed were involved or not.

What I do know, is that according to all reports, the plane took off from the La Carlota airport.

Now, it used to be, up to 2005, that private planes could fly in and out of the La Carlota military base in Caracas. This was stopped in 2005, unless, of course, you were a revolutionary or related to one, or had a connection to one, as I showed in 2006.

So, how could this supposedly unregistered plane, take off from the La Carlota military base, with or without drugs last Friday? Who allowed it? Who approved it? Who was involved?

Oh, I know, it was someone high up in the military, but like Makled and so many other cases, we will never know. No wonder these guys are so nervous that the Government could change in 2013 via the ballot box, who do you think will be fired first and investigated?

The same ones that protect and benefit from the mysterious “Narco Avioneta”. Bet on that!

The Fonden Papers-Chapter I

August 10, 2011

You all know about Fonden, the “development” Fund that Chavez created and uses as his sort of petty cash fund for immediate needs. I was reading something or other the other day and found that Deputy Carlos Ramos had sent Minister Giordani a questionnaire about Fonden.

Naive that I am, I looked up this Deputy who I don’t know, and lo and behold, I found out he is an Economist, has a masters in Political Science, has been a Deputy before and has been budget Director of Merida State and General Manager of the Alcaldia Libertador. Better yet, he even has a webpage.

Naive that I am, I believe in democracy, open information and stuff like that, I got Deputy’s Ramos’ email from his website and wrote to him telling him I am interested in Fonden, saw his press conference and was wondering if he could send me the material he talked about, promising I would let him know if I found anything interesting. (And that I would write about it in my blog, of course)

Within a couple of hours, I had a response and a promise that the material would be sent to me. The next day, his Assistant sent me all but the Minister’s response, which I am promised would be sent soon.

I really haven’t found anything earth shaking yet. Certainly nothing as significant as the US$ 29 billion discrepancy between what the fund has assigned to projects and what has been disbursed to 140 projects, but the Fund certainly does not have such a large amount of money today. That’s Chavista math for you, a US$ 29 billion discrepancy.

So, as I await for Giordani’s response on this “small” US$ 29 billion discrepancy, I find that 12% of the development investments have gone to Defense, essentially buying weapons, 11.6% to projects of the IXth. “Mixed Cuban-Venezuelan Commission”, 19% in PDVSA projects* and half a billion Bolivars to Bandes projects and drinkable water around the Nation.

Now, I really don’t know, or understand, what that “mixed” Cuban-Venezuelan Commission has to do with Venezuelan Development, or why there is this circular relationship in which PDVSA gives money to Fonden and then part of it gets sent back to PDVSA for unnamed projects. It sounds to me as illogical as most things Chavismo does.

To say nothing of fancy weapons being part of “development”, but I guess you have to keep the military happy and satisfied with new toys like Russian Jet fighters (US$ 2.5 billion) or a bunch of helicopters (Only US$ 483 million).

But the juicy story seems to be in the “missing” US$ 29 billion, equal to the country’s international reserves, for which I will have to wait for the Minister’s response and hope there is a Chapter II to this story.

And, of course, thanks Deputy Ramos!