Archive for October, 2004

Chavez wins Lybian human rights award

October 11, 2004

President Hugo Chavez was awarded the Moammar Gadhafi Human Rights Award this weekend according to a CNN report. The award was given to Chavez for resisting “imperialism” and being a champion of the poor. It also praised Chavez for his “brave heart, intelligent mind, eloquent oratory and firm hand.”


Well, let’s analyze the award and we will se that is actually quite well deserved. First of all, given Chavez’ record on human rights, it is quite fitting that he should win an award named after Gadhafi, since I am imagining it means human rights “Gadhafi style”, i.e. repression, intolerance, , persecution of reporters, threats against the media etc..


 


Second, champion of the poor is also very well deserved. When Hugo Chavez became President, according to the National Institute for Statistics there were 11.41 million people living in poverty in Venezuela. Today according to the same institute there are 14.50 million, thus Chavez deserves the title “Champion of the poor”, since he has helped create 3.1 million new ones in the last five years, despite oil prices increasing four fold.


 


Third, he was cited for his “eloquent oratory”, also well deserved, as every Sunday he talks for five or six hours and surprises Venezuelans two or three other times a week with two or three hours of improvised speeches. 


 


Finally, the prize cites him for his “firm hand” which I imagine means exactly the opposite of tolerance, compassion, unity and democracy, where Chavez also has definitely not done a great job in the last five years.


 


Fidel Castro was a previous winner of the award, leaving no doubt as to why Chavez is being awarded this prize. Castro’s name, together with the namesake of the prize certifies who Hugo Chavez is and what he stands for.


 


Next year the prize may go to a “soft” choice in Jimmy Carter unless the committee decides to give it to the only one that can top Castro, Gadhafi and Chavez: Robert Mugawe. The problem is, if Mugawe gets it, how can the prize top itself in the future? In fact, if Mugawe wins it, shouldn’t they change the name of the prize and  name it after him?


 

Chavez wins Lybian human rights award

October 11, 2004

President Hugo Chavez was awarded the Moammar Gadhafi Human Rights Award this weekend according to a CNN report. The award was given to Chavez for resisting “imperialism” and being a champion of the poor. It also praised Chavez for his “brave heart, intelligent mind, eloquent oratory and firm hand.”


Well, let’s analyze the award and we will se that is actually quite well deserved. First of all, given Chavez’ record on human rights, it is quite fitting that he should win an award named after Gadhafi, since I am imagining it means human rights “Gadhafi style”, i.e. repression, intolerance, , persecution of reporters, threats against the media etc..


 


Second, champion of the poor is also very well deserved. When Hugo Chavez became President, according to the National Institute for Statistics there were 11.41 million people living in poverty in Venezuela. Today according to the same institute there are 14.50 million, thus Chavez deserves the title “Champion of the poor”, since he has helped create 3.1 million new ones in the last five years, despite oil prices increasing four fold.


 


Third, he was cited for his “eloquent oratory”, also well deserved, as every Sunday he talks for five or six hours and surprises Venezuelans two or three other times a week with two or three hours of improvised speeches. 


 


Finally, the prize cites him for his “firm hand” which I imagine means exactly the opposite of tolerance, compassion, unity and democracy, where Chavez also has definitely not done a great job in the last five years.


 


Fidel Castro was a previous winner of the award, leaving no doubt as to why Chavez is being awarded this prize. Castro’s name, together with the namesake of the prize certifies who Hugo Chavez is and what he stands for.


 


Next year the prize may go to a “soft” choice in Jimmy Carter unless the committee decides to give it to the only one that can top Castro, Gadhafi and Chavez: Robert Mugawe. The problem is, if Mugawe gets it, how can the prize top itself in the future? In fact, if Mugawe wins it, shouldn’t they change the name of the prize and  name it after him?


 

Chavez increases royalties on heavy crude operators

October 10, 2004

President Chavez announced today that he was increasing oil royalties to the heavy oil projects from 1% to 16.66%. These projects are Petrozuata, Hamaca, Cerro Negro and Sincor. Reportedly hamaca already pays the 16.6%. These are all projects in which heavy crudes are transformed into synthetic fuels. These four projects produce a combined total of about 500,000 barrels a day today, but production is expected to reach 600,000 barrels within the next two years. Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA is a minority partner in all of these projects.


Three years ago, Venezuela’s National Assembly approved a new hydrocarbons bill, that increased all royalties from oil exploitation to 16.6% but in Venezuela, laws can not be applied retroactively, so it did not apply to projects approved before the law. In general, at current levels of oil prices, this should not be a problem for these projects, most of which were planned assuming West Texas Intermediate prices of US$ 15 per barrel. They were all given a 1% tax for the first nine years of the production as an incentive to start them. Before these projects came into existence, there were no similar projects in Venezuela.


 


Most of these projects were built using debt issued in US dollars by the projects themselves. Bonds were issued which were guaranteed by the company’s partners until the projects met certain technical specifications of actual production. Many of the bonds are of the sinking fund type, in which after a certain date, they pay not only interest on the principal, but also part for the principal. This structure is used whenever investors may find that it is hard to look down the line to the maturity of the bond.


 


As an example, the Cerro Negro 2009 bond has a coupon of 7.33% per year, but has returned principal since three years ago at a rate of 6% per semester, so that only 70% of its principal is still outstanding. It currently has a yield of 5.75%, which is quite attractive given worldwide interest rates. Another project, Petrozuata, has a bond maturing in 2017 which pays no principal until 2008 and has a coupon of 8.22%. I consider this bond to be one of the most attractive fixed income investments in Venezuela.


 


While it is reasonable, given current oil prices, to increase the royalty to this level, I am not comfortable with the way it has been done. First of all, these were contracts signed by PDVSA in which that royalty percentage was negotiated. Second, it would seem more reasonable to negotiate it with the companies, establishing a sliding schedule in case prices go down in the future. Third, I understand that all of the projects are looking to expand their operations in Venezuela; maybe this could have been negotiated rather than imposed, as it does not send the best signal to investors looking for new oil deals in Venezuela.


 


The biggest problem in my mind with the decision is one of competitiveness; Canada and Venezuela have the biggest heavy oil reserves in the world. These projects are similar to much larger projects in Canada such as Suncor, which have found a way to exploit these heavy crudes. In Canada, according to the Suncor report, the royalty is 1%, which is probably the reason why PDVSA negotiated that rate when the projects were started. Note that there are royalties and there are taxes, in both countries the royalty was 1% until today. Suncor as a company pays an effective tax rate of 36% which is probably similar to Venezuela’s. Thus, Canada is more attractive from that point of view.


 


I am in no position no to know or evaluate at this time whether this hurts Venezuela’s competitive advantage in heavy crudes or not. There are other issues to consider such as production costs. These projects make use of natural gas, which is cheaper in Venezuela, so that may be an advantage. Financially at current oil prices the decision should not affect any of the projects as they were planned for much lower oil prices. The one affected the most is Hamaca, which only came on line recently, the rest have benefited for quiet a while of the lower royalty.


 


In any case, you read The Devil’s for free and today you get, also for free, two investment recommendations: If you are aggressive buy Suncor stock (NYSE:SU), the company’s cash flow is fantastic and if oil prices stay high it will keep going up. If you just want income, buy Petrozuata’s 2017 bond with a coupon and yield of 8.22% for the next 13 years and you start getting back you principal in 2008. Benefit from the Devil’s Excrement, not this one, the real one!


 


(You also get to see my new blooms for free!!!)

Chavez increases royalties on heavy crude operators

October 10, 2004

President Chavez announced today that he was increasing oil royalties to the heavy oil projects from 1% to 16.66%. These projects are Petrozuata, Hamaca, Cerro Negro and Sincor. Reportedly hamaca already pays the 16.6%. These are all projects in which heavy crudes are transformed into synthetic fuels. These four projects produce a combined total of about 500,000 barrels a day today, but production is expected to reach 600,000 barrels within the next two years. Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA is a minority partner in all of these projects.


Three years ago, Venezuela’s National Assembly approved a new hydrocarbons bill, that increased all royalties from oil exploitation to 16.6% but in Venezuela, laws can not be applied retroactively, so it did not apply to projects approved before the law. In general, at current levels of oil prices, this should not be a problem for these projects, most of which were planned assuming West Texas Intermediate prices of US$ 15 per barrel. They were all given a 1% tax for the first nine years of the production as an incentive to start them. Before these projects came into existence, there were no similar projects in Venezuela.


 


Most of these projects were built using debt issued in US dollars by the projects themselves. Bonds were issued which were guaranteed by the company’s partners until the projects met certain technical specifications of actual production. Many of the bonds are of the sinking fund type, in which after a certain date, they pay not only interest on the principal, but also part for the principal. This structure is used whenever investors may find that it is hard to look down the line to the maturity of the bond.


 


As an example, the Cerro Negro 2009 bond has a coupon of 7.33% per year, but has returned principal since three years ago at a rate of 6% per semester, so that only 70% of its principal is still outstanding. It currently has a yield of 5.75%, which is quite attractive given worldwide interest rates. Another project, Petrozuata, has a bond maturing in 2017 which pays no principal until 2008 and has a coupon of 8.22%. I consider this bond to be one of the most attractive fixed income investments in Venezuela.


 


While it is reasonable, given current oil prices, to increase the royalty to this level, I am not comfortable with the way it has been done. First of all, these were contracts signed by PDVSA in which that royalty percentage was negotiated. Second, it would seem more reasonable to negotiate it with the companies, establishing a sliding schedule in case prices go down in the future. Third, I understand that all of the projects are looking to expand their operations in Venezuela; maybe this could have been negotiated rather than imposed, as it does not send the best signal to investors looking for new oil deals in Venezuela.


 


The biggest problem in my mind with the decision is one of competitiveness; Canada and Venezuela have the biggest heavy oil reserves in the world. These projects are similar to much larger projects in Canada such as Suncor, which have found a way to exploit these heavy crudes. In Canada, according to the Suncor report, the royalty is 1%, which is probably the reason why PDVSA negotiated that rate when the projects were started. Note that there are royalties and there are taxes, in both countries the royalty was 1% until today. Suncor as a company pays an effective tax rate of 36% which is probably similar to Venezuela’s. Thus, Canada is more attractive from that point of view.


 


I am in no position no to know or evaluate at this time whether this hurts Venezuela’s competitive advantage in heavy crudes or not. There are other issues to consider such as production costs. These projects make use of natural gas, which is cheaper in Venezuela, so that may be an advantage. Financially at current oil prices the decision should not affect any of the projects as they were planned for much lower oil prices. The one affected the most is Hamaca, which only came on line recently, the rest have benefited for quiet a while of the lower royalty.


 


In any case, you read The Devil’s for free and today you get, also for free, two investment recommendations: If you are aggressive buy Suncor stock (NYSE:SU), the company’s cash flow is fantastic and if oil prices stay high it will keep going up. If you just want income, buy Petrozuata’s 2017 bond with a coupon and yield of 8.22% for the next 13 years and you start getting back you principal in 2008. Benefit from the Devil’s Excrement, not this one, the real one!


 


(You also get to see my new blooms for free!!!)

Nice new blooms

October 10, 2004

 



Pictures of a Dendrochilum Cobbianum(?) which I have posted before. The plant is getting huge, it is about one meter in diameter (three feet) and sends dozens of long shots each in turn with dozens of little flowers aout 1/4 of an inch in size.It amkes a beautiful plant with and without flowers. Below on the left a close up of the flower itself.



Top left close up of flower for Denrochilum picture above. Right: Beautiful Venezuelan Cattleya Jenmanii



Brazilian Catlleya Aclandie on the left above and a hybrid of Aclandie on the right: Cattleya Lulu Hot Pink, both VERY fragrant.



Brazilian Cattleya Intermedia, they love my orchid room, making big specimen plants, this is another one.

On Mathematical Models of the Recall Vote and Fraud part XIII: Benford questions results once more

October 10, 2004

Physicist Imre Mikoss presented his data on tests on the August 15th. recall vote and comparison to Benford’s law two weeks ago at the third Simon Bolivar University seminar. His presentation is now online. While Pericchi and Torres have done similar tests, Mykoss does a couple of very interesting things which are worth posting for their implications.


Results from the 2000 election: Mikoss has looked at the data from the 2000 Presidential vote. This is interesting because even though electoral results would seem like a natural set to test Benford’s law, nothing guarantees that it works in Venezuela or everywhere. Below is a graph the first digit in the number of votes obtained by Chavez’ challenger Francisco Arias Cardenas in the 2000 elections. :


 




Frequency of occurence of the first digit for the votes in favor of Arias Cardenas at each machine in the 2000 as a function of the digit.


 


The graph shows the frequency of occurrence expected from Benford (green bar) and the frequency seen in the election (red bar) in the vertical axis versus each of the digits in the horizontal axis. The graph not only looks like Benford’s law, but the author performed statistical tests and obtained in the case of the number of votes for Arias across the nation to have a parameter S (which I believe is chi^2, but the presentation does not define)=0.003. Chavez’ votes in the same election, as well as the difference between the two numbers at each machine were all found to follow Benford’s law with S<0.014. Thus, Venezuelan electoral results did follow well Benford’s law in 2000, which needed to be established and seems to be established by this comparison.


 


Results from the recall vote: The same test on the results from the recall vote do not agree well with Benford’s law as sown below for the Si and the No frequencies. As in the case of Pericchi’s analysis for the second digit presented here earlier, Mykoss finds that the Si votes agrees better (S=0.33) than the No vote (S=0.97) as seen below:


 




Frequency of occurence of the first digit for the Si votes at each machine as a function of the digit.


 



 


Frequency of occurence of the first digit for the Np votes at each machine as a function of the digit.


 


 


-“Reverting the data”: Mikoss then studies rather than the Si or No numbers, the set of differences (No-Si) for each voting machine. This apparently has the advantage that it provides a more uniform set of numbers that is not as bound as the pure set in which machine size bounds numbers. In fact, this difference for the recall vote shows the best comparison to Benford’s law with S=0.1.


 


But there is an additional reason for doing this. If you want to “simulate” tampering with the data and you calculate (NO-Si) at each machine, then it is very easy to “transfer back” No votes to the Si votes and measure chi^2 as a function of this “reversion” of the votes. Mikoss tested this, “reverting” votes by equal percentages in all machines and obtains the following graph:


 



 


 Chi squared of the comparison between Benford’s law for the difference (No-Si) as a function of the percentage of No votes “reverted” to the Si


 


 


The suggestion is a) the fits is much better if you shift votes from No to Si, with a very well defined minimum in which chi^2 goes down sharply by two orders of magnitude, corresponding to about 18% of the votes being shifted from No to Si. b) The work of Mikoss shows that you can use such testing to test for this reversion. C) There are suggestions that this was done given that the work assumes all machines were altered, which would seem surprising.


 


For completeness, below are the results for the second digit of Arias and Chavez in 2000 as well as the Si and the No in the recall referendum, which have also been studied by Pericchi and posted here before:


 



 


           Frequency second digit Arias  2000                Second Digit Chavez 2000


 



               Second digit Si vote RR                                         Second digit No vote RR

On Mathematical Models of the Recall Vote and Fraud part XIII: Benford questions results once more

October 10, 2004

Physicist Imre Mikoss presented his data on tests on the August 15th. recall vote and comparison to Benford’s law two weeks ago at the third Simon Bolivar University seminar. His presentation is now online. While Pericchi and Torres have done similar tests, Mykoss does a couple of very interesting things which are worth posting for their implications.


Results from the 2000 election: Mikoss has looked at the data from the 2000 Presidential vote. This is interesting because even though electoral results would seem like a natural set to test Benford’s law, nothing guarantees that it works in Venezuela or everywhere. Below is a graph the first digit in the number of votes obtained by Chavez’ challenger Francisco Arias Cardenas in the 2000 elections. :


 




Frequency of occurence of the first digit for the votes in favor of Arias Cardenas at each machine in the 2000 as a function of the digit.


 


The graph shows the frequency of occurrence expected from Benford (green bar) and the frequency seen in the election (red bar) in the vertical axis versus each of the digits in the horizontal axis. The graph not only looks like Benford’s law, but the author performed statistical tests and obtained in the case of the number of votes for Arias across the nation to have a parameter S (which I believe is chi^2, but the presentation does not define)=0.003. Chavez’ votes in the same election, as well as the difference between the two numbers at each machine were all found to follow Benford’s law with S<0.014. Thus, Venezuelan electoral results did follow well Benford’s law in 2000, which needed to be established and seems to be established by this comparison.


 


Results from the recall vote: The same test on the results from the recall vote do not agree well with Benford’s law as sown below for the Si and the No frequencies. As in the case of Pericchi’s analysis for the second digit presented here earlier, Mykoss finds that the Si votes agrees better (S=0.33) than the No vote (S=0.97) as seen below:


 




Frequency of occurence of the first digit for the Si votes at each machine as a function of the digit.


 



 


Frequency of occurence of the first digit for the Np votes at each machine as a function of the digit.


 


 


-“Reverting the data”: Mikoss then studies rather than the Si or No numbers, the set of differences (No-Si) for each voting machine. This apparently has the advantage that it provides a more uniform set of numbers that is not as bound as the pure set in which machine size bounds numbers. In fact, this difference for the recall vote shows the best comparison to Benford’s law with S=0.1.


 


But there is an additional reason for doing this. If you want to “simulate” tampering with the data and you calculate (NO-Si) at each machine, then it is very easy to “transfer back” No votes to the Si votes and measure chi^2 as a function of this “reversion” of the votes. Mikoss tested this, “reverting” votes by equal percentages in all machines and obtains the following graph:


 



 


 Chi squared of the comparison between Benford’s law for the difference (No-Si) as a function of the percentage of No votes “reverted” to the Si


 


 


The suggestion is a) the fits is much better if you shift votes from No to Si, with a very well defined minimum in which chi^2 goes down sharply by two orders of magnitude, corresponding to about 18% of the votes being shifted from No to Si. b) The work of Mikoss shows that you can use such testing to test for this reversion. C) There are suggestions that this was done given that the work assumes all machines were altered, which would seem surprising.


 


For completeness, below are the results for the second digit of Arias and Chavez in 2000 as well as the Si and the No in the recall referendum, which have also been studied by Pericchi and posted here before:


 



 


           Frequency second digit Arias  2000                Second Digit Chavez 2000


 



               Second digit Si vote RR                                         Second digit No vote RR

On Mathematical Models of the Recall Vote and Fraud part XIII: Benford questions results once more

October 10, 2004

Physicist Imre Mikoss presented his data on tests on the August 15th. recall vote and comparison to Benford’s law two weeks ago at the third Simon Bolivar University seminar. His presentation is now online. While Pericchi and Torres have done similar tests, Mykoss does a couple of very interesting things which are worth posting for their implications.


Results from the 2000 election: Mikoss has looked at the data from the 2000 Presidential vote. This is interesting because even though electoral results would seem like a natural set to test Benford’s law, nothing guarantees that it works in Venezuela or everywhere. Below is a graph the first digit in the number of votes obtained by Chavez’ challenger Francisco Arias Cardenas in the 2000 elections. :


 




Frequency of occurence of the first digit for the votes in favor of Arias Cardenas at each machine in the 2000 as a function of the digit.


 


The graph shows the frequency of occurrence expected from Benford (green bar) and the frequency seen in the election (red bar) in the vertical axis versus each of the digits in the horizontal axis. The graph not only looks like Benford’s law, but the author performed statistical tests and obtained in the case of the number of votes for Arias across the nation to have a parameter S (which I believe is chi^2, but the presentation does not define)=0.003. Chavez’ votes in the same election, as well as the difference between the two numbers at each machine were all found to follow Benford’s law with S<0.014. Thus, Venezuelan electoral results did follow well Benford’s law in 2000, which needed to be established and seems to be established by this comparison.


 


Results from the recall vote: The same test on the results from the recall vote do not agree well with Benford’s law as sown below for the Si and the No frequencies. As in the case of Pericchi’s analysis for the second digit presented here earlier, Mykoss finds that the Si votes agrees better (S=0.33) than the No vote (S=0.97) as seen below:


 




Frequency of occurence of the first digit for the Si votes at each machine as a function of the digit.


 



 


Frequency of occurence of the first digit for the Np votes at each machine as a function of the digit.


 


 


-“Reverting the data”: Mikoss then studies rather than the Si or No numbers, the set of differences (No-Si) for each voting machine. This apparently has the advantage that it provides a more uniform set of numbers that is not as bound as the pure set in which machine size bounds numbers. In fact, this difference for the recall vote shows the best comparison to Benford’s law with S=0.1.


 


But there is an additional reason for doing this. If you want to “simulate” tampering with the data and you calculate (NO-Si) at each machine, then it is very easy to “transfer back” No votes to the Si votes and measure chi^2 as a function of this “reversion” of the votes. Mikoss tested this, “reverting” votes by equal percentages in all machines and obtains the following graph:


 



 


 Chi squared of the comparison between Benford’s law for the difference (No-Si) as a function of the percentage of No votes “reverted” to the Si


 


 


The suggestion is a) the fits is much better if you shift votes from No to Si, with a very well defined minimum in which chi^2 goes down sharply by two orders of magnitude, corresponding to about 18% of the votes being shifted from No to Si. b) The work of Mikoss shows that you can use such testing to test for this reversion. C) There are suggestions that this was done given that the work assumes all machines were altered, which would seem surprising.


 


For completeness, below are the results for the second digit of Arias and Chavez in 2000 as well as the Si and the No in the recall referendum, which have also been studied by Pericchi and posted here before:


 



 


           Frequency second digit Arias  2000                Second Digit Chavez 2000


 



               Second digit Si vote RR                                         Second digit No vote RR

CNE laughs at opposition again

October 9, 2004

 


CNE Directors Carrasquero and Rodriguez in separate (here and here) statements, laugh at us and take us for fools on the issue of voters with no addresses. Maybe they are right, we were quite foolish on everything we accepted on the day of the recall vote and the weeks leading to it, but their sheer arrogance on this issue is just incredible. They want to turn the problem of 1.8 million voters without addresses in the electoral registry into an issue of social justice and compassion, arguing that these people have a right to vote even if their houses have no proper address. This is simply not the issue at all and shows their actual ignorance about the reality of life in the barrios when they want to turn the controversy into whether barrios have proper addresses or not.


 


The truth is that even the poorest barrios do have a system of addresses, it may not be Manhattan and it may be complicated, but barrios have calles, veredas, senderos, sectores, parcelas,  carreras and dozens of complicated nomenclatures that do lead to where people live. This is not a case of incomplete addresses it is a case of NO addresses which violates the electoral law that requires it, mostly as a way of insuring that political parties do not move voters across municipalities and even states in order to manipulate the outcome of elections.


 


The charge by Carrasquero and Rodriguez is so ridiculous, that in the Chacao municipality of Caracas, where the barrios are quite well established and have well defined addresses, 40% of new voters do not have an address in their registration. The total numbers are 2.11 million new voters out of which 1.73 million have no address in their registration. In some states, the total number of new voters without addresses reaches 99% and yes, the accusation is that many of these voters do not even exist.


 


Meanwhile while Carrasquero and Rodriguez are so careless about something that is explicitly stated in the electoral law, the CNE President signed a letter to the Coordinadora Democrática saying that they will simply not hand over any of the information requested about the recall vote on August 15th. including the notebooks that could be used to check if the number of voters per machine equals that of the notebooks. The argument is that they “tacitly renounced to that right” when they asked that the process be declared invalid. Thus, the CNE refuses to hand over data, when Venezuelan legislation grants the citizens the right to public data, using a convoluted legal argument. Thus, legality becomes for Carrasquero, who is a lawyer, something to be used if convenient and ignored if it fails to fit his political purposes and he laughs at us again.  


 


They keep laughing at us, but we keep trying…should we?

The Curse by Teodoro Petkoff

October 8, 2004

Another great Editorial in Thursday’s Tal Cual


The Curse by Teodoro Petkoff


My subtitle: The Devil’s Excrement revisited


 


Those that do not learn from history are condemned to repeating it, said a philosopher (and another one had said before him that repetition, in general, is like a farce). Venezuela is living anew under the sign of the oil boom; once again the umbrella of oil prices beyond all delirium, envelopes our economy…and our politics. In the 70’s we live through this and also in the 80’s. For the third time, the country is literally swimming in petrodollars.


 


What remained of those booms? Were the dreams of development, social well being and political stability fulfilled? On the contrary! a long period of economic decline that has now lasted for a quarter of a century, accompanied by the horrifying impoverishment of our society, both in its middle levels as well as the most humble ones.


 


Well into the 90’s, the signs of crisis in the political system were visible. The “Caracazo”, the military coups of 1992, the victory of Caldera the outsider, leading a coalition of “groupuscules” from the left, that announced the Chavez’ subsequent victory, were the tolls of a gigantic bell of destiny that was ringing for a weakened political system.


 


In the happy years of the “fat barrels”, the state apparatus hypertrophied itself, it turned heavy and obese, the bureaucratic fat covered its muscles, state institutions were sacrificed in the altar of presidentialism and executivism (the parliament was minimized, justice mediatized, the mechanisms of control notched down). The State expanded into dozens of new organizations and companies, whose inefficiency ran even with the out of orbit job mania that populated them. Rentism and the search for income were the dominant variables both in the public and the private sector.


 


The maximization of oil income exaggerated social, economic and political pressures coming from all interest groups of society, to put their hand, legally or illegally, to the largest possible piece of that income. The overflow of corruption was the inevitable excrescence that appeared on the body of the administration.


 


CAP had offered to manage abundance with criteria of shortage. It was not possible.


 


Even before the “thin barrels’ had returned, the oil income had diluted in an out of control current public spending, in expensive projects and of little or null profitability and an important part of it moved abroad, in a colossal capital flight. It is the curse of the petrosates.

Can we escape this time that unknown force? Up to know in the behavior of Chavez Government there is nothing that point to it. They are repeating the patterns of behavior that once left the bitter retaste of failure. Countering the dynamic and logic of petrostate societies requires political will, together with the knowledge of them, which does not appear to exist in the Government.


 


Once again rentism marks public economic behavior; once again pressures of all sorts are taking us to waste gigantic income, to increment the fiscal deficit and to make grow public debt. The state apparatus expands even more its jurisdiction…and its inefficiency. Super ministries, superpowers, missions express: It is a broken record. Everything has the air of something seen before.