Revisiting Venezuela’s Debt

June 23, 2011

With the new debt announced two weeks ago and approved by now, it is interesting to revisit the country’s debt. First, let’s look at the evolution of local debt, which with the new Bill will now grow to Bs. 135 billion, as shown in the graph below:

Of course, this debt is not as worrisome, as it can always be devalued out of the picture. In fact, if you divide each year above by the exchange rate at the time (using the official rate of exchange), then the graph is as follows:

Despite the fact that total debt in Bs. went up from last year to this year, for example (I am including half of the new Bill as issued in 2011), local debt in US$ actually went down, thanks to the devaluation in January.

That is why foreign debt is more important. If one adds Venezuela’s and PDVSA’s bonds (I am not taking into account Chinese loans, other loans and the like), then you get the following graph, in which you can see the effect of all of the debt that PDVSA has been issuing in the last few years. Essentially the Republic’s debt has barely gone up, the increase in the graph below is all coming from new PDVSA issues. (I am excluding in the graph the payment of US$ 2.5 billion coming up on July 10th., but I am including US$ 5 billion as part of the new Bill, but I just learned that PDVSA issued today US$ 1.5 billion of PDVSA 2022 which it sold to the Venezuelan Central Bank. The latter is not included)

Finally if you add both local and total external debt you get:

Since GDP is US$ 235 billion, then Debt to GDP ratio is around 40% without the Chinese funds and other loans which would bring it up to 50% or so. (Of course, GDP is measured in Bs. at Bs. 4.3, so that the true GDP measure is lower)

The reason that many investors are not as concerned is that when you look at maturities:

You can see, that there is no bond due next year, only US$ 2 billion in 2013 and a little over US$ 4 billion in 2014. It is not until 2017 that things could get hairy, as over US$ 7 billion come due (Note there are two bonds due that year) and, of course, you have to pay interest.

The big problem is then the slope at which debt is increasing. Venezuela and PDVSA can not continue issuing debt at this rate, something has to give. Total debt payments each year are now US$ 4 billion. If no debt were issued between now and 2017, that year it will be US$ 7 billion in capital, US$ 4 billion in interest, that is a total of US$ 13 billion, not exactly a small piece of change. But the reality is that under current planning by then, Venezuela would have issued another US$ 40 or 50 billion in debt, which would almost double interest payments.

And that is the real problem, the current model is simply unsustainable when the country produces less oil each year and all of these bonds are issued not to invest, but to maintain a lower rate of exchange.


8 Responses to “Revisiting Venezuela’s Debt”

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  2. Gringo Says:

    Thanks for the graphs. The increase in debt roughly coincides with the increase in the price of oil in the latter part of the decade. Coincidentally, it also parallels the increase in prison population.

    Another good graph would be to show both debt and either oil price or dollars of oil exports. That would remind one of Mexico in 1976-1982 which, after the big offshore oil find in 1976 coupled with big increases in oil price later in the decade, had an enormous increase in oil export revenues with an even faster increase in debt from borrowing in anticipation of future bonanzas.

    Unfortunately, by the summer of 1981, the price of oil started to fall, and by early 1983 Mexico had a massive devaluation. Dog Hill and all that, for Lopez Portillo fans out there.

  3. moctavio Says:

    I dont, the terms are unknown, how much has been paid or disbursed is also unknow. Hard to include

  4. gustavo coronel Says:

    I still do not know where exactly fits the chinese loan that is already around $36 billion. It is debt but you don’t seem to have it in either the gvt. side or PDVSA’s side and does not show on your graphs, as far as I can see.

  5. moctavio Says:

    absolutely right!!!!!, I corrected that at the last minute without thinking. I had the text right, the graph wrong and changed the text. Now is corrected. Many Thanks!!!

  6. Plasmaj Says:

    I agree with your overall view, but one note on the 2017 maturity. The 17N is an amortizer. It has a 2.05bn maturity in each year from 2015 – 2017, not the full 6.15 in 2017

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